Professor Nouri Talabany

Observations on the proposal to establish a property claims commission in the Kirkuk region

2007-10-12T16:06:00.001-07:00

24 April 2003
By Dr Nouri Talabany

Thank you for your invitation to the meeting on establishing a ‘Property Claims Commission in Kirkuk’. I think that we must make a distinction between the city of Kirkuk and the rural areas, especially the area around the Saddam Irrigation Project.

Under the Agrarian Reform Act of 1958, landowners were allowed a maximum of 2000 donums. Any land they possessed over and above this was taken from them and reserved for distribution to farmers who had no land in the area. From 1969 onwards, agent such as Ali Daham al Ubaidi and others, working on behalf of the regime, forced landowners to sell their land to them. Most of these previously arid lands were irrigated by a government project established in the end of 1970 and then distributed to Arab tribes brought from central and southern Iraq. These settlers were also armed whilst Kurds in neighbouring villages were not allowed to carry so much as a knife. In this way, Kurdish farmers in the area were unable to acquire any land and many were obliged to make a living as tenant farmers on land that they had previously owned. These farmers now hope to return to reclaim such land as the government gave, illegally, to Arab settlers in large parts of Dubz, Daquk and Duz-Khurmatu districts. In 1963, more land in the Dubz district and in the villages around the city of Kirkuk was confiscated by the Iraqi regime. In about 44 villages – all mentioned in my book ‘Arabization of the Kirkuk Region”, page 51 – landowners and farmers were prevented from cultivating their land and it was given to Arab settlers. My own family village near Kirkuk, called ‘Sona-Goli’, was taken from us and we were not even allowed to go near it.

In the city of Kirkuk, the regime built a great number of houses for Arab settlers and gave these districts Arab names. It also gave some settlers plots of land and money from the Real Estate Bank to enable them to build houses. Almost all of this land was owned by Kurds or by the state. Other property, owned by Kurds and Turkmans, was confiscated for a variety of reasons; for example, a member of the family was outside Iraq, was in prison for political reasons, had been hanged for some political crime - or supposed crime. The majority of the owners were forced to leave the city. Since the regime confiscated most of the documents from those expelled, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for them to produce their deeds.

Since 1970, the regime has continued to distribute plots of land inside the city to military personnel, members of the Secret Services and Security Service, the Ba’ath party and the Popular Army, employees of the IPC and of all government sectors. All these people were Arab settlers who have been assisted financially by the regime and, as a result, have been nicknamed ‘the 10,000 dinars’ because, in the beginning, they were given that amount plus a plot of land and a job. At that time a dinar was worth three dollars.

In the north and east of Kirkuk province, the regime encountered difficulties in settling Arab tribes from fear of the Peshmarga, so it razed all the villages and small towns. Farms, orchards, wells and even cemeteries were destroyed and most of the inhabitants forced into concentration camps outside Kirkuk province. In 1988, these areas were the target of the Anfal operations. Being at too great a distance form the Turkish and Iranian borders to be able to escape, the population was forced to go to the area controlled by the regime where they were captured and sent into the desert. I am sure that almost none of these people will possess the deeds to their properties as they lost everything, but each group is known to have belonged to their own particular village.

Many people still have the deeds to their property in the city or to their farms in the villages. However, for those whose deeds were destroyed when they were expelled by the regime, their only proof will be the testimony of people who lived in the same city or district.

The regime forbade Kurds to buy property in the city or province of Kirkuk. No Kurd was allowed to sell his property to anyone other than an Arab. They were also denied permission to repair their properties and so some were forced to sell their homes and go elsewhere. Very wide streets were bulldozed through other districts of the city, demolishing many Kurdish properties, so that yet more people were forced to leave.

In recent years, since the regime was not applying the system so rigorously to Turkmans, some Kurds sold their homes to Turkmans with whom they had a good relationship, in the hope that they would be able to re-register these properties in their own names when the regime had fallen. For these people, we will have to search for the name of the owner prior to 1970. In general, unless the registers prior to 1970 were falsified, they will provide evidence of the genuine owners of many properties in Kirkuk. Most of the new, Arab named districts in the city were built for the new settlers – all of them Arabs – with the express purpose of changing the ethnic composition of the city and province.

Most members of the various institutions in Kirkuk are Ba’athists as, from the early 1970s, the regime practiced a policy of ‘Ba’athisization’ as well as Arabization. Most of them were brought from other parts of Iraq. Others are Turkmans, or even some Kurds, and this includes most of the civil servants and judges. For this reason, we cannot rely on them to make decisions. We must set up a new body to examine claims impartially.

Most Kurdish civil servants were forcible expelled to other parts of Iraq and, even after retirement, were not allowed to return to Kirkuk. This was my own experience when I was compulsorily retired from my post as Professor of Law at Baghdad University in 1982. I wanted to return to my city but I was forbidden to do so and was obliged to go to Arbil instead. All these Kurdish civil servants should be allowed to go back to Kirkuk and to claim the properties which they, or their parents, owned in the city and province.

The Arabs knew, when they settled in Kirkuk, that they were occupying properties which belonged to others. As I said, some among them were given plots of land which were owned by Kurds or by the state and were also given financial assistance to build houses. Today, they see themselves as the legitimate owners of these properties but, if you check the pre-1970 registers, you will find that most of them were not there then. They were settled there later by the regime as part of its plan to change the ethnic composition of the city and province which, since 1972, has gone under the Arabic name of ‘Al Ta’Amim’, which means ‘nationalization.

Everything which the regime has done in Kirkuk province violates the UN Charter of Human Rights which forbids the removal of anyone from his property against his will. The ethnic cleansing of the Kirkuk Region has echoes of the policies of Stalin and Hitler and is like that practiced in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor. All the acts of the Iraqi regime are illegal and contrary to international law.

Those Arabs settled in the region of Kirkuk were well aware that their purpose in being there was to change its ethnic composition. They were a part of the regime and served in the Security Services, the army, the Ba’ath party and Ba’athist organizations. They should now return to their places of origin in central and southern Iraq. If you ask any one of them where he or his father lived before 1970 he will tell you where he came from. Not one of them was registered in Kirkuk according to the 1957 Census, which is only one considered valid. All the displaced Kurds must be permitted to return to reclaim their rightful homes in their own cities. They have suffered for decades, losing their properties and jobs. Their children have lost their future. A new Iraqi government must now compensate them for their physical and mental suffering.

The policies of Arabization and ethnic cleansing were devised by the higher echelons of the regime and were implemented by all government departments and by the Secret Service. Most of the governors of Kirkuk were appointed from among the upper echelons of the Ba’ath party. As yet we are unaware of any secret documents regarding these policies but, should any come to light, they will facilitate the decision making on restitution.

My proposal is that a High Commission of five to seven members should be established. These members should be legal professionals and other experts in land registration in the Kirkuk Region. If you wish I will propose certain individuals who are all from the Kirkuk region though some were expelled from Kirkuk and are presently living in Arbil and Sulaimani.

* Observations presented to a meeting organized in Washington by ‘US Institute for Peace’ on 22nd April 2003, to establish a ‘Property Claims Commission in the Kirkuk Region’.

** Professor of Law, Director of the Kirkuk Trust for Research & Studies

Kirkuk, Past and Present

2007-09-30T13:29:00.000-07:00

Dr. Nouri Talabany *

Much has been said about the ethnic identity of Kirkuk but, to understand its present situation, we need to study the ethnic composition of the city in the past and to compare it with that of the present. The changes that have taken place there are the result of the policies of the previous Iraqi regime – policies that were against international law and which were responsible for the serious situation in which the citizens of Kirkuk now find themselves. If we appear to be concentrating on Kirkuk and using it as a model for the comparison of past with present, it is because it was the main focus of the previous Iraqi regime’s racist policy.

The principal source of livelihood on the vast, fertile plains of the Kirkuk region was agriculture, so most of the city’s inhabitants were craftsmen practising related skills, though there were also commercial enterprises. Others worked in administration or were freelance professionals. The people grew their crops and engaged in animal husbandry according to the seasons but often used out-dated methods. It was natural for there to be a higher concentration of people in the villages close to the rivers and other water sources in the northern and eastern parts of the Kirkuk region, and fewer inhabitants in the part where water was scarcer. Simply by studying their customs an observer would very easily have understood the social structure of the society. However, the discovery of oil brought a great many people from elsewhere in Iraq to the city and changed the way of life completely. This is why we can say with confidence that the development of the oil industry provided the impetus for thousands of Arab families and others, such as Assyrians and Armenians, to settle in Kirkuk.

The majority of the population of the city of Kirkuk was Kurdish and Turkman. The Turkmans could trace their families back to the Ottoman era. Later, Arabs settled there. Writing of the ethnic composition of the city, Shamsadin Sami, author of the celebrated Encyclopaedia “Qamusl Al-A’alam” stated that, “Three quarters of the inhabitants of Kirkuk are Kurds and the rest are Turkmans, Arabs and others. 760 Jews and 460 Chaldeans also reside in the city”.

The Kurds lived, and still live, mainly in the eastern and northern districts of the city but they also reside in other districts alongside Turkmans and other ethnic groups. They are the oldest population of the city and region, followed by the Turkmans. The author of the famous “Guide to the History of Famous People in the Iraqi Liwas (Governorates),” Vol.2, compiled by Arab researchers and published in 1947 in Baghdad, dealt mainly with Kirkuk. It states that the Turkmans were the more recent members of the population of Kirkuk and that their ancestors arrived there in the mid seventeenth century with the invasion forces of the Ottoman Sultan Murad the Fourth who conquered Iraq and expelled the Saffawids from the land. The Guide also states that, before returning to Constantinople after his conquest of Baghdad, Sultan Murad left army units in position to control the strategic route linking Baghdad and Anatolia and that the present day Turkmans are descended from those troops.

The heads of Turkman families in Kirkuk, such as the families Nafetchi and Aochi, have confirmed that their ancestors came with Sultan Murad. Mr. Nazem Nafetchi stated, in 1947, that their ancestor, Kahraman Agha, came from Anatolia with Sultan Murad and that he appropriated land called Baba Gurgur, near Kirkuk city, from which he extracted oil by primitive methods. Abdullah Beg Aochi also confirmed that his family has its roots in Konya and that his grandfather, Emir Khan, accompanied Sultan Murad and settled in Kirkuk.

The Guide gives the religion of the inhabitants of Kirkuk as Islam and stresses their strong adherence to their faith. It points out that the region boasted many mosques and takias. There were also Christian, Subbi and Jewish citizens. The Jews (who were forced to leave Iraq for Israel at the beginning of the 1950s) engaged in commerce, finance and jewellery. The Christians were involved in all the professions. Each ethnic group lived in harmony with the others. Mostly Kurdish tribal people who also had an important presence inside the city populated the districts, sub-districts and villages.

The mayors of Kirkuk were almost always Kurds, notably from the Talabany family. During the Ottoman era and the monarchical period some Turkmans became mayor, but there was never an Arab mayor until 1969 when an Arab from the Tikriti family was nominated by the Baathist regime.

The city of Kirkuk was the centre of the Wilayet of Sharazur until 1879 when it became a “sanjak” and was annexed to the Wilayet of Mosul. In 1918, when the British army occupied the Wilayet of Mosul, the British administration created a new Governorate under the name of Arbil, which was made up of the districts of Arbil, Rawanduz and Koysinjaq. In 1921, the British estimated the population of Kirkuk to be 75,000 Kurds, 35,000 Turks, 10,000 Arabs, 1,400 Jews and 600 Chaldeans. A Committee of the League of Nations, which visited the Wilayet of Mosul in 1925 to determine its future, estimated that the Kurds in Kirkuk made up 63% of the population, the Turkmans 19% and the Arabs 18%. As no census was taken in Iraq until 1947, most population figures were estimates. An official estimate, published in 1936, gave the population figure as 180,000. The author of the aforementioned Guide estimated the population of Kirkuk to be half a million but that did not include nomadic tribes. It says that the Arabs lived mainly in the southwest of the region of Kirkuk whilst the Kurds were mainly in the northeast. Kurds, Turkmans and Arabs inhabited the centre of the region.

Most of the members representing Kirkuk in the Iraqi parliament during the monarchical period were Kurds and some Turkmans. There was seldom an Arab representative until after the Arab tribes had been settled on the plain of Hawija from 1935 onwards.

The 1947 Census gave no precise details of the ethnic composition of the population. However, the 1957 Census, in column 6, gave details of the ethnic composition of Iraq according to mother tongue. According to this Census the ethnic composition of Kirkuk was as follows: 48.3% Kurd, 28.2% Arab, 21.4% Turkman, the remainder being Chaldo-Assyrian and others. The 1957 Census is the only one accepted as valid since later ones were organized after the Iraqi regime had begun its policy of ethnic cleansing by which thousands of Arab families from central and southern Iraq were settled in the city and region of Kirkuk. Thousands of Kurdish families were expelled.

There were only two Arab families resident in the city of Kirkuk, the Tikriti and the
Hadidi. In addition, there were some Arabs working as civil servants or serving as officers and soldiers in the 2nd Division of the Iraqi army, most of which was stationed in Kirkuk. Until 1955, there was just one high school in the region of Kirkuk, where I was a student. The majority of the students were Kurds and Turkmans with a number of Arabs, Assyrians, Chaldeans and Armenians. Most of the Arab students were the children of the civil servants and military personnel or of those working for the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC).

By long-standing tradition, the Kurds, Turkmans, Chaldeans and Jews have had their own cemeteries. The Arabs, being a minority, buried their dead in the Turkman cemeteries. Since 1991, however, the Iraqi regime has created special cemeteries for Arab settlers and has banned Arab Shi’ite settlers from taking their dead back to Al-Najaf for burial. Later, the regime even began to change the inscriptions on Kurdish tombstones to Arabic in an attempt to prove that there have been Arabs in Kirkuk for many, many years!

According to the Guide, the Tikriti family is the main Arab family of Kirkuk. The head of the family, Mr.Mazher Al-Tikriti, tells how their great grandfather, Shebib, came from Syria in 1048 Hejri with the Ottoman Sultan Murad the Fourth, as did the ancestors of the Turkmans. As a reward for their help, the Sultan gave the Al-Tikriti family villages and lands in the south-west of Kirkuk and in the small city of Tikrit.

Other Arab tribes who settled in Kirkuk during the monarchical period are the Al-Ubaid and the Al-Jiburi. The Al-Ubaid came from the north-west of Mosul when they were forced out of that area by the Arab Al-Shamar tribe. They settled on the plain of Dialah where they were in continuous conflict with the Arabs of the Al-Aza tribe. To resolve the disputes between them, the cabinet of Yasin Al-Hashimi decided, in 1935, to settle them in the Hawija district after water from the Lower Zab River was used to irrigate the land. The settlement of the Al-Ubaid and Al-Jiburi tribes was the first Arab settlement in the Kirkuk region. Previously, the area was semi-desert and was used by the Kurds only in springtime as grazing ground for their sheep. Generally, relations between Kurds, Turkmans and even the new Arabs of Hawija and other ethnic minority groups were good until the Baath party seized power in 1963.

The new regime used the militia of the “Popular Guard”, who were mainly Arab Baathists and Turkmans, to attack the Kurds. They concentrated their efforts on the poor areas where they destroyed all the homes. In June 1963, the Baathist regime was responsible for the destruction of 13 Kurdish villages around Kirkuk. The populations of a further 34 Kurdish villages in the Dubz district near Kirkuk were forced to leave and Arabs from central and southern Iraq were brought in and settled in their place. Between 1963 and 1988, the Baathist regime destroyed a total of 779 Kurdish villages in the Kirkuk region and obliterated their cemeteries. There had been 493 primary schools, 598 mosques and 40 small medical centres in these villages. Orchards and farms were burnt, cattle confiscated and wells blown up. The obvious purpose of this destruction was the eradication of all evidence of any habitation. In all, 37,726 Kurdish families were forced out of their villages and, at a conservative estimate; there were at least 5 to 7 people in the average Kurdish rural family.

During the Iraq/Iran war, the Iraqi Regime also destroyed about ten Shi’ite Turkman villages in the south of Kirkuk.

Inside the city of Kirkuk, the Iraqi regime has taken many measures to force the Kurds to leave. Oil company employees, civil servants and even teachers have been transferred to southern and central Iraq. City streets and schools have been renamed in Arabic and businesses forced to adopt Arab names. Kurds are not allowed to sell their properties to anyone other than Arabs and are forbidden to buy other property. Thousands of residential units have been built for new Arabs and given Arabic names. The historic citadel, with its mosques and ancient church has been demolished. Tens of thousands of Arab families have been brought in to the city and given housing and employment.

These measures were intensified after the Gulf War of 1991. The regime has prevented most of the Kurds who fled their homes during the uprising of that year from returning. In 1996, before the preparation of the 1997 Census, a so-called “Identity Law” was passed, by which Kurds and other non-Arabs were required to register themselves as Arab. Anyone refusing to do so was expelled to the liberated part of Iraqi Kurdistan or to southern Iraq. In its 2003 Report, Human Rights Watch estimated that, since 1991, between 120,000 and 200,000 non-Arabs have been forcibly expelled from the Kirkuk region.

That situation continued until the fall of the Baathist regime in April 2003, when the city of Kirkuk was liberated. Those who were forcibly expelled wanted to return to their homes and land, but many obstacles have prevented this. However, thousands of families have returned to Kirkuk, but continue to live in tents in a very bad situation.

When the Transitional Administrative Law was approved, article 58 aimed to resolve the problem of Kirkuk by creating mechanisms to normalise the situation in the city. However, both the governments of Dr. Allawi and Dr. Jaafari have done nothing to implement Article 58. This has created suspicion amongst the Kurds against the central Iraqi government. Article 140 of the new Iraqi constitution has adopted Article 58 of the TAL, and set a deadline for its implementation for 2007. If the new government of Iraq is not going to implement the article within this deadline it means that the issue of Kirkuk is not going to be resolved, with dangerous consequences for the future of Iraq.
----------------------------------------
* This paper was presented to a conference concerning the Kirkuk issue, orgnised in London in July, 2001.

References:

1. Abdul Majid Fahmi Hassan, “Daleel Taarihk Mashaheer Al Alwiat Al Iraqiah / A Guide to the History of Famous People of the Iraqi Liwas”, Vol. II, Liwa Kirkuk, Dijla Press, Baghdad 1947, p. 55.
2. Shamsadin Sami, Qamus Al-A’alam, Istanbul, Mihran Press, 1315 Hi/1896.
3. Abdulmajid F. Hassan, ibid. P.58.
4. Ibid. p 284.
5. Ibid. P.301
6. Ibid. p. 289.
7. Ibid. p. 339.
8. Nouri Talabany, Arabization of the Kirkuk Region, First edi. Kurdistan Studies Press, Uppsala, Sweden 2001, p. 94.
9. Appeal from the Federation of the Kurdish Organizations against Ethnic Cleansing based in London addressed to Mr. Kofi Annan and others, dated 3rd February 2003.

The Kurdish Question with Special Reference to Southern Kurdistan

2007-09-15T16:17:00.000-07:00

The Kurdish Question with Special Reference to Southern Kurdistan, According to New Principles of International Law

Nouri Talabany
Professor of Law

The roots of the Kurdish problem lie in the events following the ending of the First World War when the Kurds, together with other nations such as Arabs and Armenians then under the control of the Ottoman Empire, attempted to establish their rights. They were especially encouraged when, in 1918, the American president, Woodrow Wilson, declared his support for the principle of the right to self-determination for all nations.

This principle, that all nations have the right to self-determination, was later enshrined in the preamble to the Charter of the United Nations. It was very precisely stated on the 14th December 1960 when the General Assembly of the UN passed a resolution to end the colonial system, and again in 1966, in a Charter concerned with economic, social and cultural rights whose first article re-emphasized this right to self-determination.

These international documents make clear that such a right applies only to those populations who consider themselves as nations. So, what do we mean by ‘nation’? We mean a distinct people or race, be it large or small, who share a common heritage and culture - such as language, religion, economic or political institutions - and who inhabit a specific land. The existence of this land is of vital importance in creating a sense of nationality and in giving to its people their special characteristics. It is this sense of unity, of belonging, by which a people may be considered as a nation. If this feeling is present then their status as a nation cannot be denied.

The Kurds share a common language and history and have lived on their ancestral land from earliest times. It is, surely, beyond doubt that they meet all the criteria for recognition as a nation. The Treaty of Sevres, signed on 10th December 1920, recognized the Kurds as a nation and the Kurdish problem as an international issue. It proposed a solution which was reasonable given the circumstances of that time. Although the Treaty was never ratified by the Ottoman Empire, it remains an important international document as it was the first such to mention the Kurds specifically. This is why we must examine the terms of this Treaty and its proposals for the future of the Kurds.

As a result of the failure to implement the terms of this Treaty, the Kurdish question became a matter of internal law and the Kurds, previously divided between the Ottoman Empire and Persia, found themselves divided between four states. The principle of establishing international boundaries became a matter of inviolate sovereignty, however illegitimately these boundaries may have been created originally. Until the beginning of the nineteen thirties, the main objective of the many Kurdish revolts was the independence of Kurdistan and the founding of a Kurdish state. By the end of that decade, as a result of their division, their aim became to find a solution within each of these states.

Events following the Gulf War of 1991 pushed the Kurdish Question to the forefront of international law and politics once more. That is why I will address the question of whether the Kurdish problem, especially in Southern Kurdistan, (Iraqi Kurdistan) can be spoken of again as a subject within international law.

Part 1 - The Treaty of Sevres and the Kurdish Question:

The Treaty of Sevres was signed between the government of the Ottoman Sultan and those of Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Belgium, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Chekoslavakia, and Serbo-Croatia, Armenia of the Tashnak and the Hejaz.

Articles 62, 63 and 64 were specifically designed to find a solution to the Kurdish problem in the Ottoman Empire.

Article 62 speaks of the creation of a committee of three parties - Britain, France and Italy - whose task it would be to formulate an autonomous system for the Kurds in the regions between the Euphrates and the south of Armenia to the borders of Syria and Mesopotamia.

Article 63 obliges Turkey to put into operation the decisions of this committee.

Article 64 speaks of the creation of a Kurdish state under certain conditions.

The Treaty stated that, within one year of its implementation, the majority of the Kurds in these regions must ask for separation from Turkey. This condition accords with the principle of self - determination, as it is necessary to consult the people on their wishes. It further stated that the Assembly of the League of Nations must accept that the Kurds are able to govern themselves and that this same Assembly must propose the creation of this Kurdish State.

When all these conditions were met, Turkey would have been obliged to accept the proposal of the League of Nations. A new Treaty would then have been signed between Turkey and the main signatories to the Treaty of Sevres.

The last paragraph of Article 64 dealt specifically with the problem of the Kurds in the Wilayet of Mosul, which was under the control of the British army. According to this paragraph, the main signatories of Sevres will not oppose the desire of the Kurds in this former Ottoman Wilayet to be a part of the Kurdish State. The Kurds represent a majority of the population in this Wilayet which includes the present governorates of Mosul, Dohuk, Arbil, Kirkuk and Sulaymani and a part of Diyala.

From an objective interpretation of these Articles of the Treaty of Sevres, and considering the situation of that time, it is clear that the object of this Treaty was the creation of a state for the Kurds in Northern Kurdistan (now in Turkey). This would have been joined later with the south of Kurdistan (now Iraqi Kurdistan). Had there been a genuine intention on the part of the great powers to put it into effect, it suggested the establishment of a Kurdish state in two stages. But the interests of these powers, and especially of Britain and France, lay in Southern Kurdistan where there is oil. The British authorities, which held a mandate on Iraq, joined the Wilayet of Mosul to the new Iraqi State so as to be able to send the oil from this Wilayet, by pipeline, through Iraq to the Mediterranean. Then, with the rise to power of General Mustafa Kemal in Turkey, the Treaty was rescinded and not just Britain and France, but even the newly created Soviet Union supported the new Turkish state and assisted it in its efforts to quell the Kurdish revolts against the Kemalist regime. A later Treaty signed in Lausanne in 1923, made no mention of the Kurds and the Kurdish problem became a part of the internal law of those countries between which they were divided.

Following the collapse of the invasion of Kuwait by the Iraqi regime in 1991, the Kurds of Southern Kurdistan rose against the regime and liberated most of their region, including Kirkuk, whereupon the regime launched a savage counter-attack on the civilian population. As a result, in April 1991, the Security Council passed Resolution No. 688 that aimed to end this tragic situation. For the first time since the Treaty of Sevres, an international decision was taken which, whilst speaking of all the Iraqi people, mentioned the Kurds in particular. This resolution concerns the internal affairs of a member state of the UN and it discriminates between the state and the people.

We have now to discover whether the Kurdish question in Southern Kurdistan, will be resolved by international law.

Part 11 - The Kurdish question according to the new principles of international law:

The ending of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union, together with the events following the Gulf War, were the main reasons for establishing several new principles of international law. Before these events, and especially since 11th September 2000, intervention in the internal affairs of states was considered to be illegal. However, in the changed circumstances, the principle of equality between nations and the respect for human rights will make intervention by the international community in the internal affairs of states just, acceptable and legal. This will apply particularly in cases where the policy of ethnic cleansing is tantamount to genocide. For example, the catastrophes in Bosnia, Kurdistan, Somalia, Rwanda and Kosovo presented the international community and its organizations with the opportunity to intervene to save endangered lives in these countries. Had the new principles of international law not been established, there would have been no such intervention.

The tragedy of Halabja in March 1988, which focused the attention of people everywhere, the killing of 182,000 civilian Kurds in ‘Anfal’ operations, the destruction of more than 4000 Kurdish and Christian villages by the Iraqi regime and the deportation of tens of thousands of Kurdish Faily families to Iran, brought no positive response from the international community. The dictatorial regime in Baghdad took note of this silence and invaded Kuwait on 2nd August 1990, but because of the oil in Kuwait and other Gulf states, the Security Council took decisive action against it. Such a decision would not have been possible just a few years ago.

Security Council Resolution No. 688, of 1991, was taken after the mass exodus of Kurds from Southern Kurdistan. Its main consequence was the creation of Operation Provide Comfort which established a Safe Haven for the protection of Kurds in this area and without which many thousands of people would have died in a very short time. This was a clear, direct intervention in the internal affairs of the state of Iraq and was a decision of major significance to international law since it censures the state for its use of force internally and considers it a threat to international security. It represents an important shift in the position of the Security Council. It is concerned here not with the state, but with the people, in contradiction to its declared principles and its main objective of finding solutions to problems between member states.

In September 1991, the regime in Baghdad recalled all its administration from most of the Kurdish region. Later, it imposed an economic blockade on it, thus making the region subject to two embargoes - one Iraqi, the other international, which was imposed on the whole of Iraq by the Security Council. The consequence of this action was the creation of a de facto Kurdish administration. Shortly after, the people of this part of liberated Kurdistan elected a Parliament, which formed a government to administer the internal, as well as the external, affairs of this region.

Unfortunately, the Kurdish leaders failed to take advantage of this sequence of events. The 1995 referendum held to accept Saddam Hussein as President of Iraq and, later, the elections of a so-called Parliament for Iraq, without the participation of the people of the liberated part of Kurdistan are just two examples. The Kurds failed to grasp their opportunity to demonstrate to the international community the fact that the regime in Baghdad does not consider them as a part of Iraq and that, therefore, their problem must be treated according to international law. Later, the acceptance by the Iraqi regime of Security Council Resolution No.986, by which it was allowed to sell oil for the purchase of humanitarian supplies, and which arranged for the provision of 13% of the resulting revenue to be given in aid to the Kurds in that region, proves that even the international community accords this part of Kurdistan a special status. Although the western countries continue to speak of the territorial integrity of Iraq and not of its divisions, they remain obliged to protect the Kurds according to the new international law which safeguards them against further attempts at genocide by the Iraqi regime. Several political parties and their parliamentary groups and organizations in Europe, have frequently asked the international community to protect the autonomous region of Kurdistan against intervention by the Iraqi regime and neighbouring states.

The prevention of crimes against humanity is now one of the principle obligations of the international community and its organizations and they have the right to intervene wherever, and whenever, such crimes occur. The Security Council itself has taken action with regard to Somalia, Cambodia and Haiti. For example, in its Resolution No. 940 of July 1994, it authorizes member states to “form a multinational force to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military”. Events in Kosovo and East Timor illustrated this policy, as was emphasized by the statements of western political leaders and the international community that international intervention in these countries is legal. In an interview with the Independent on Sunday newspaper in May 1999, the British Foreign Secretary said “What this whole episode has thrown up is the unacceptability of governments using aggression against their own people and then claiming sovereignty as a blanket protection for whatever they are going to do”.

At NATO’s 50th Anniversary Summit in Washington, similar views were forcefully expressed. The British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, declared that a new “doctrine of international community” was required and added “we are all internationalists now, whether we like it or not”. “We cannot turn our backs on conflicts and the violation of human rights within other countries if we still want to be secure”, he said.

An international conference was held in The Hague in mid- June 1999 to find a peaceful solution to the war in Southern Sudan. Sixteen states participated, among them most European countries as well as the USA, Kenya and Japan together with the European Union and other organizations. If the international community is sincere in its wish to establish peace and security in the Middle East, a similar conference should be organized to seek a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question in this important region.

Until now, the international community has viewed the Kurdish problem as humanitarian, not political, and its inaction puts at risk the stability of the whole region and threatens world security. The Kurdish question is one of the great problems of the Middle East and will remain so until a solution is found. This solution can only be the recognition of the right to self-determination of the Kurdish people. Such recognition does not necessarily mean the creation of an independent state but, perhaps, peaceful co-existence within a federal state in each of which Kurds are living.
Paper presented to a conference to discuss the Kurdish question, held in Washington in the Spring of 2002.
2002

-------------------
On 20th October 2002, the former Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein, granted an amnesty to all prisoners and
Those under arrest to mark the occasion of his so-called referendum (in which he received 100% of the votes). The number of those released was not declared but an estimated 100,000 and 150,000 people were released. Sadly, the hopes of the families of those taken in the Anfal operations in 1988 that their loved ones would be among them were dashed, as none of them were among those freed. About 5000 young Kurdish Failys were also arrested during the Iraq-Iran war (1988 – 1998) but none of them were released. It can safely be assumed that all these civilian Kurds were killed. In the mid-1980s Saddam Hussein was asked about those taken during the Anfal operations he replied that they had been sent to hell.

Professor Dr Nouri Talabany

2007-09-15T16:15:00.000-07:00

Professor of Law, Independent MP in the Parliament of Kurdistan Region

• Born in the city of Kirkuk and completed elementary, intermediate and secondary education there.
• Received BSc in Law from the University of Baghdad.
• Received Ph.D. in Law from the Sorbonne, France.
• Taught at the universities of Basra, Baghdad, Sulaimani and Salahadin in Arbil from 1968 until December, 1982, when he was compulsorily retired for political reasons.
• His first articles, in Kurdish, were published in "Hiwa", a Kurdish magazine, while he was a student at the University of Baghdad in the late fifties.

His numerous publications include:
• Textbooks in French, his 1968 Thesis on French Law and his Thesis for the Diploma in Law in 1966 also concerning French Law and many other research studies and articles in French.
• Textbooks in Arabic on Iraqi Law, 1st edition 1972, 2nd edition 1979, and another textbook, also on Iraqi Law, in 1979.
• He was the first person to publish a book on the Arabization of the Kirkuk Region, in Arabic. The 1st edition was published in Sweden and Kurdistan in 1995, the 2nd edition in London in 1999 and the 3rd edition in Arbil in 2004. It was translated into Kurdish and English in 1999 and published in Sweden and, later, republished in Kurdistan in 2004.
• He was also the first person to propose a federal system for Kurdistan in a study written in Arabic, in London, in 1974. This appeared in the Iraqi Academic magazine, Kurdish Section, Vols. 16 & 17, 1987, Baghdad, and in Kurdistan, in a pamphlet, in 1992 and 2005. It was translated into Kurdish and published in 2005 and 2006
• He is the author of the first dictionary of legal terms in Kurdish, assisted by a Kurdish scholar, Tawfiq Wahby, in London in 1974. This Dictionary of Law has been published in Kurdistan in 2004 in four languages – Kurdish, Arabic, French and English, and republished in 2006.
• He has written more than 120 studies and articles in Kurdish, more than 60 in Arabic and more than 30 in English and French, published both in Kurdistan and elsewhere. Some of them have been presented at international conferences in the USA and Europe.
• He was the first person to write, in Arabic, a Draft Constitution for the Iraqi Kurdistan region, which was published in Arbil in 1992. This draft has been translated into Kurdish and English and republished in 1999 and, again, 2002.
• He was a member of the High Legal Committee in the Kurdistan Region in 1992 whose main objective was to prepare the projects of law for the parliament of Kurdistan.
• He was Chairman of the Kurdish Organisation for Human Rights in Britain for seven years from 1993 and Director of the Kirkuk Trust for Research and Studies in London from 2000.
• He was President of the High Electoral Commission of the Kurdistan Region from July 2004 until December of the same year.
• At present, he is an independent MP in the Parliament of the Kurdistan Region.
August, 2007.

Who Owns Kirkuk? The Kurdish Case - Middle East Quarterly

2007-08-26T14:13:00.000-07:00

Who Owns Kirkuk? The Kurdish Case - Middle East Quarterly

Arabization of the Kirkuk Region

2007-08-14T04:45:00.000-07:00

Prof. Nouri Talabany
Arabization of the Kirkuk Region, 141 pp., Uppsala, 2001, ISBN 91-972498-2-3

Table of Contents

Foreword by Lord Avebury.

Preface.

I - A synopsis of the history and geography of the Kirkuk Region.

II - The Non-Kurdish ethnic population in the Kirkuk Region: The Turkmans.
1. Origins.
2. Population Estimates.
3. Relations between Kurds and Turkmans.
4. Politicaal Orientations of the Turkmans.

IlI - Earliest Attempts at Arabization.
A - The period of the monarchy.
The role of the oil company in changing the ethnic character of the city of Kirkuk.
The building of the Hawija Irrigation Project to settle Arab tribes in the Kirkuk Region.

B - The period from 1958 to 1968.
Measures towards Arabization taken by the February 1963 coup organizers in the Kirkuk Governorate.

C - The period from 1968 to the present.
Measures taken by the Iraq regime inside the city of Kirkuk.
Measures taken by the regime to Arabize the entire Kirkuk Governorate.
1. City District of Kirkuk.
2. Dubz District (Arabized to Al-Debiss).
3. Hawija District.
4. Chamchamal District.
5. Duz-Khurmatu District.
6. Kifri District.
7. Kala'r District..

IV The result of Arabization and destruction of the Kirkuk Region.

Appendices.

-------------------------

PREFACE

THE KIRKUK REGION, rich in petroleum deposits and vast farm lands, has been one of the principal obstacles to finding a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question in Iraq.

Geographically, the region straddles the strategic trade routes between Iran, Iraq, Syria, Turkey and beyond. However, it was the discovery of vast quantities of petroleum deposits in the region that led Great Britain, in 1926, to append Kirkuk and the former Ottoman Wilayet of Mosul (of which the Kirkuk region was a part) to the newly-created state of Iraq. This new state, created in 1921, was under the Mandate of Great Britain. Ever since, and particularly after 1963, there have been continuous attempts by the central government of Iraq to Arabize the strategic region of Kirkuk.

To understand better the reasons for this policy, let us, first, briefly consider the geopolitics, history and demography of the Kirkuk region, and then analyse the situation both before and after these attempts.

Ethnic Cleansing by the Iraqi regime in the Kirkuk Region

2007-08-14T04:38:00.000-07:00

Nouri Talabany - Professor of Law

The Treaty of Kasr Shireen - Zehab, signed in 1639 between the representatives of the Ottoman and Safawid Empires determined the official division of Kurdistan between these two powers. From then on, those Kurdish Emirates, which were either wholly or partially independent, were obliged to seek protection from one or either of these two powers if threatened by external aggression or in the face of internal unrest caused by conflict between the ruling families. The Sultans and the Shahs and their representatives actively encouraged such conflicts with the express intention of weakening the Kurdish Emirates. Consequently, the power of these emirates was systematically undermined and, by the mid - nineteenth century, they had ceased to exist. The last Kurdish emirates were the Ardalan (617 - 1284 Hi) whose capital was the city of Senna, and the Baban (1106 - 1267 Hi) whose capital was Sulaymania.[1]These two Kurdish emirates deserve special mention because the Kirkuk region, or a part of it, was once a part of either one or the other of them for various periods.

The celebrated Kurdish poet from Kirkuk, Sheikh Rezza Talabany (1835 - 1910), who wrote his verse in Kurdish, Persian, Turkish and Arabic, mentioned this in a narrative poem, written in Kurdish, in which he recalled his childhood in the Kurdish emirate of Baban before it was ruled by either the Persians or the Ottomans.[2] As a young man of twenty-five or so, our poet went to the Ottoman capital, Constantinople, and in the course of his journey, he visited the grave of the Kurdish Sufi, Sheikh Nouradin Brifkani. At the graveside he recited a long poem in Farsi, telling of how he had journeyed from Sharazur, of which Kirkuk was a part, to visit the “The Roman country” as the Kurds referred to Turkey at that time. In 1879, when the Ottoman Empire annexed the Wilayet of Sharazur to the Wilayet of Mosul, Sheikh Rezza expressed his sadness and disappointment in a poem, in Turkish, in which he told the people that Mosul had now become the centre of their Wilayet and Nafi’i Effendi its Wali. “Mosul has become the centre of the Wilayet and Nafi’i Effendi its Wali. Poor people. What has befallen you? In grief, cover your heads with earth”.

As well as Sheikh Rezza’s poetic testimony to the history of the city of Kirkuk, we have the words of the Ottoman explorer Shamsadin Sami, author of the celebrated Encyclopaedia “Qamusl Al A’ala’m”, who wrote of Kirkuk: ”It is located within the Wilayet of Mosul which is a part of Kurdistan. It is at a distance of 25 pharsings (100 miles) south-east of the city of Mosul. It is situated amidst a range of parallel hills next to an extended valley called the Vale of Adham. It is the administrative centre for the Sharazur Wilayet and has a population of 30,000 ”.[4] As regards the ethnic composition of the city, Shamsadin Sami asserts that “three quarters of the inhabitants are Kurds and the rest are Turkmans, Arabs and others. Seven hundred and sixty Jews and four hundred and sixty Chaldians also reside in the city”.[5]

Under Ottoman rule, Turkman families were encouraged to settle in the city and were given preferential treatment by the Ottoman rulers. The post of “mutassallim”, or governor, and many other prestigious positions and titles were accorded them,[6] and the majority of Kirkuk’s civil servants came from among the Turkman community with the result that the Ottoman rulers enjoyed continued support. The Encyclopaedia of Islam states: “ Whatever the circumstances of their coming to the region, the Turkmans of Kirkuk always provided strong support for the Ottoman empire and its culture and an abundant source of Ottoman officials.”[7] But despite all this, the city of Kirkuk retained its distinctive Kurdish character.

The Wilayet of Mosul remained a part of the Ottoman Empire until the end of the 1st World War when it was occupied by British troops under the command of General Marshall on 17th May 1918. He withdrew his troops on 27th May, only to re-occupy it at the end of October that same year, after the signing of the Modrus Agreement between Britain and the Ottomans. Secret British documents revealed that the Foreign Office had warned General Marshall not to advance on the Wilayet of Mosul.[8] With the exception of the Sulaymania region, the greater part of the Mosul Wilayet was occupied by the British army and governed by British political officers. The decision to remain in the Wilayet was taken by the British when they discovered oil in the region of Kirkuk, which is an important part of the Wilayet of Mosul. Under the terms of the secret Sykes Picot Agreement, signed in 1916 between France and Britain, this Wilayet was given to France. According to the later San Remo Agreement between France and Britain, France gave it to Britain in return for a share in the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC), which was established by the Ottomans and the Germans to exploit the oil in the two Wilayets of Baghdad and Mosul.[9] This discovery eventually led to the annexation of the Wilayet of Mosul to the newly created Iraqi state after a decision taken by the League of Nations in 1925. To encourage support for this annexation, King Faisal 1 visited most of the Wilayet, including Kirkuk, in December 19, and urged the people to demand to join to new Iraqi state created in 1921.[10]

Most Iraqi researchers are agreed that the Wilayet of Mosul became a part of Iraq with the help of the British. It was in their economic and strategic interest to annexe it so as to be able to send oil from Kirkuk through Iraqi territory to the Mediterranean ports and from there to Europe. Because of the bad relations between Britain and Turkey caused by Turkey’s claim that the Wilayet of Mosul was part of its territory, it was difficult at that time to send it through Turkish territory.[11] The annexation of the Wilayet was sanctioned by international decision, but this decision was conditional on both Britain and Iraq honouring the wishes of the Kurds that civil servants in the Kurdish area be Kurds and that Kurdish was to be the official language.[12] In reality, successive Iraqi governments ignored this international agreement and proceeded to implement a policy which was completely opposed to it, especially in the Kirkuk region. This became abundantly clear during the direct British rule of Kirkuk when Turkish remained the official language in administration and education as it had been under the Ottomans, and important positions in the city continued to be given to the Turkmans.[13] Later, when the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC), which was run by the British and which had its headquarters in Kirkuk, began operating, it brought the majority of its employees in from other parts of Iraq. Many thousands of technicians and other professionals, as well as small trades people, came to live in the city, bringing their families with them.[14] To accommodate them, hundreds of housing units were constructed and new districts developed, mostly for Arabs, Assyrians and Armenians. Research suggests that the population of Kirkuk increased by 39,000 between 1947 and 1957 and that, between 1919 and 1968, there was a fivefold increase in the population.[15] But, although the Kurds remained the majority in both the city and the governorate, far fewer of them were employed by the company than were members of other ethnic groups.[16]

During the years of the monarchy, all Iraqi governments encouraged non-Kurds to settle in Kirkuk and prohibited the use of the Kurdish language in education there. In passing, I would like to mention my own bitter experience of this. At both primary and secondary school we were obliged to learn everything by heart as all the text books were in Arabic and we could not understand them. Even so, these governments did not expel Kurds from Kirkuk, nor did they bar the people from nearby villages from coming to reside in the city. But in the mid 1930s, all this began to change when the government of Yassin Al Hashimi brought Arabs from the Al-Ubaid and other nomadic tribes to settle in the Hawija district in the south-west of Kirkuk.

The July 1958 revolution encouraged the Kurds to hope that these discriminatory policies would be reversed, and they asked that Kurdish be used as the language of instruction in the primary schools, at least in those districts, which remained wholly Kurdish. But their hopes were dashed when extreme Arab nationalists were appointed to prominent positions in Kirkuk and they felt convinced that the situation would never change. This conviction was strengthened when General Tabakchali, the new Commander of the 2nd Division stationed in Kirkuk, took several decisions which were to the obvious advantage of the Turkmans. He began by ousting the Kurdish mayor and appointing a Turkman in his place. He then sent a number of secret memoranda to the Ministry of Defence in Baghdad - the real power in Iraq at that time - accusing the Kurds of causing unrest and of trying to found a so-called “Kurdish Republic” which would be joined later by other areas of Kurdistan.[18] His “evidence” for this was the request by Kurdish intellectuals to establish an Education Department to supervise Kurdish education in the region. During General Tabakchali’s command, from July 1958 to March 1959, he concentrated all his efforts on creating tensions and divisions between Kurds and Turkmans.[19]

The appointment of a new commander, General Al- Janabi, in mid-March 1959, brought yet another change in the situation. During his short command the Kurds felt relaxed and celebrated Nawroz openly for the first time in the city’s history. However, three months later, General Al-Janabi was dismissed and the situation steadily deteriorated until Kurds and Turkmans clashed in July 1959. From then on, the Kurds were once more subjected to ever increasing discrimination. This time is considered as a time of fear and forced expulsion of Kurds from Kirkuk. It marked the beginning of a period of terror for the Kurds when they were forced to leave the city. Special terrorist groups were formed from Turkmans, collaborating with the security forces, whose task it was to assassinate prominent Kurdish figures in the city. [20] This situation continued until the coup d’etat by the Ba’ath party on 8th February 1963. From then on, the campaign of terror against the Kurds, led by the “National Guard” of Turkmans and Ba’athists, intensified. Several densely populated districts were demolished and 13 Kurdish villages located near Kirkuk and the IPC oil installations were destroyed. The inhabitants of 33 villages in the Dubs district, close to Kirkuk, were forced to leave and Arab tribes were brought in and settled there. [21] Other measures taken by the regime against the Kurds in Kirkuk were:

1. Dismissing many Kurdish employees of the Oil Company or transferring them to facilities outside the governorate, and even transferring low-ranking civil servants to southern and central Iraq.

2. Hiring large numbers of inexperienced Arabs as local police and oil workers.

3. Surrounding the city with military observation posts and creating “security zones” near the oil plant and laying mines there.

4. Settling armed Arab tribes in evacuated Kurdish villages and forming “irregular units” from them to help attack Peshmarga and Kurds in the area around Kirkuk.

5. Re-naming city streets and schools in Arabic and forcing businesses to adopt Arab names.

6. Conducting a terror campaign and forcing people to abandon their villages so as to settle Arabs there.

The Ba’ath party returned to power in a second coup d’etat in 1968. Shortly after seizing power, the regime instigated a policy deliberately designed to change the ethnic character of Kirkuk and of the governorate. Civil servants, schoolteachers and oil company employees who had escaped the previous expulsions, were transferred and replaced by Arabs. Any Kurd, having once left Kirkuk, is never allowed to return, and this is what happened to most of those transferred.[22] The regime also took the following measures:

Kurdish districts, schools, streets, markets and businesses were given Arabic names.

Houses were demolished in Kurdish neighbourhoods to allow for the unnecessary construction of wide roads and the owners were neither compensated nor allowed to buy other property.

The names of “Arab new-comers” were added to the 1957 census so that it appeared that they had lived in Kirkuk since before 1957.

Kurds were only allowed to sell their properties to Arabs and were not permitted to buy other property. Permits to build or renovate were refused. In the early eighties, these measures were extended to the Turkmans also.

False charges were laid against Kurds so that they left the city, and their homes and belongings were confiscated. Kurdish youths were arrested and imprisoned by the security police without trial. Police vehicles were seen taking corpses clad in Kurdish costumes to a cemetery called “Ghariban” near the Kirkuk-Sulaymania road.

The governorate’s administrative offices and the headquarters of the trade unions and other organisations were moved to the arabized section of the city.

Thousands of residential units were built for Arab workers near the Kirkuk-Hawija-Tikrit, Kirkuk - Baghdad and Kirkuk - Laylan roads.

The ancient citadel of Kirkuk, which contained several mosques and a very old church, was demolished.

The city and surrounding area was transformed into a military camp, and military fortifications were built inside and around Kirkuk.

Tens of thousands of Arab families were brought in, with guaranteed jobs and housing. The government offered money and housing to Kurds who would leave Kirkuk for central or southern Iraq, or a free plot of land if they went to the “Autonomous Region”.

The Iraqi regime’s policy of the ethnic cleansing of the Kurds began in 1963 and became much harsher in 1968. In the mid-eighties it directed this policy against the Turkmans. The Childo/Assyrians and Armenians were simply considered as Arabs!

After the nationalisation of the IPC in June 1972, the regime changed the historic name of Kirkuk to Al Tamim, meaning “nationalisation”. In 1976 it also reduced the area of the governorate by annexing four Kurdish areas to the neighbouring governorates, thus making the Kurds a minority in the Kirkuk governorate.[23] Where the regime was unable to settle Arabs, it destroyed all the Kurdish villages and forced their inhabitants into concentration camps. The Anfal operations of 1987 and 1988 claimed the lives of about 180,000 Kurdish civilians, most of whom were from the Kirkuk region. Since the villagers in that region lived far from international borders, they were unable to reach them and so surrendered to the army and secret services and were later sent to the south of Iraq where they were massacred.

The Iraqi regime’s policy of ethnic cleansing continued without comment or challenge from either the Iraqi oppositions groups or from the international community, even though its measures were far more severe than those used in other countries such as Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor, which have been condemned by the international community.

By the end of the eighties, Kirkuk city had lost its historic character as the Arab settlers had become dominant and were ruling the city and its administration, and security and the army were all under their control. Most of the best agricultural land was given to them. It was plain to everyone that people from outside the area were in charge and that the original inhabitants had become strangers in their own city.

This state of affairs continued until the Gulf War in 1991. After the Iraqi regime’s defeat in Kuwait, Ali Hassan Al Majid, then Minister of Defence, took many measures in the city to preserve the status quo. For example, he arrested more than 30,000 Kurds and held them for several days in confined spaces, without water or food, as a result of which many of the elderly and sick died. He also ordered the destruction of a number of Kurdish sectors of the city. After fierce fighting, the city was taken by the Kurds on 21st March 1991. During three days of street battles, many Kurdish civilians, among them women and children, were killed in the bombardment by Iraqi artillery and helicopter gunships.

Because of Kirkuk’s strategic importance to the regime, determined efforts were made to re-occupy it with the collaboration of the “Mujahidin Khalk”, a group from the Iranian opposition supported by Saddam Hussein, whose member’s act as mercenaries for him. Some of these mercenaries succeeded in entering the city by disguising themselves as Peshmarga. From the 27th to the 29th March, Kirkuk was subjected to such an intense bombardment that its inhabitants were forced to evacuate the city, leaving behind their possessions, which were looted, by the Iraqi army and the Arab settlers who returned with military help.

Most of the Kurds and Turkmans forced to leave Kirkuk were unable to return for fear of arrest. It can be said that the collapse of the uprising of March 1991 was a further reason for many Kurds and Turkmans leaving their city. Those who did return, especially the young people faced intimidation and arrest.

During negotiations between the Iraqi regime and representatives of the “Kurdistan Front”, the regime agreed to allow the citizens of Kirkuk to return to their homes, but this promise was only partially honoured. After the collapse of the negotiations, and especially after the withdrawal of the Iraqi administration from three governorates of Kurdistan in September 1991, the Kurds became the target of a renewed reign of terror, which intensified during the years from 1994 to 1996 and was particularly severe at the beginning of 1997 during the preparations for a new census. The methods used by the Iraqi regime exceeded even those used during the apartheid era in South Africa. Kurds were issued with official forms on which they were required to declare that they had been wrongly registered as Kurds in previous censuses. They were told that anyone refusing to sign these forms would be expelled from the city and, in this way; the regime ensured that thousands of Kurds were expelled from Kirkuk. Even after this census, the regime continued its policy of expulsion. In declarations made by Izzat Ibrahim, vice-president and responsible for arabization in Kirkuk, it was publicly declared that no non-Arab would be permitted to remain in Kirkuk.[]

To date, more than 108,000 people have been expelled from the areas under the control of the regime, especially from Kirkuk. Most of these people are now living in camps in appalling conditions and are dependent on aid from international relief organisations. As a result of their continuing misery, some of them, especially the young people, try to make their way to Europe illegally and many lose their money, and sometimes their lives, before arriving there.

Sadly, the international community still ignores the plight of these people. It puts no pressure on the Iraqi regime to halt this racist policy, which is completely contrary to Security Council Resolution No. 688 of 1991 and against all those international documents to which, as a member of the UN and its organisations, Iraq is a signatory. Meanwhile, the majority of the Iraqi opposition still refuses to condemn the regime’s policy which endangers co-existence between Kurds and Arabs in Iraq and which will probably lead to the disintegration of the Iraqi state.

From the Iraqi regime’s ability to continue expelling the people of Kirkuk from their homes, in flagrant violation of international law and Resolution No.688, which condemns this policy, it is obvious that it will not stop unless forced to do so by the resolve of the international community. Only in this way will those expelled be able to return to their homes and the Arab settlers be sent back to the parts of Iraq from which they came originally. This will only happen when all of the Kurdish region which remains under the control of the regime, especially Kirkuk, comes under the control of the international community until Saddam Hussein’s regime ends and democracy is established in Iraq. This would provide the only guarantee of protection for the civilian population there. The request for this was made by 122 Kurdish civil organisations and political parties, both inside and outside Kurdistan, supported by several organisations and public figures in Europe, in a memorandum presented to the Security Council, other international organisations and western states on 29th December 2000.[25] The memorandum also stressed that such a measure would contribute “to the establishing of peace and security in the otherwise turbulent Middle East”.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1] 1 Mohammed Amin Zaki, “The History of Kurdish States and Emirates in the Islamic Era”, translated from Kurdish to Arabic by Mohammed Ali Awni, 2nd edition, London, 1986, pp 276 - 291 and from pp 416 - 422.

[2] Sheikh Rezza Talabany is one of the foremost Kurdish poets. To date, six editions of his poetry have been published: in Baghdad in 1935 and 1946, in Iran, in Sweden in 1996, in Sulaymania in 1999 and, most recently, in Arbil in 2000. Many studies have been written about his poems - one of them in English by G.D.Edmonds. On 2nd May 2001, the M.Sc. thesis of Mr. Hawkar Raouf Mohammed was presented for discussion at the College of Art at the University of Sulaymania. (“Al Itihad”, a weekly Kurdish paper, No.419, of May 4, 2001).

[3] Ata Terzibashi, “The Kirkuk Poets” vol.2, in Turkish, printed by Al - Jamhuriah Press, Kirkuk 1968, and p.144.

[4] Shamsadin Sami, “Qamus Al - A’alam” Istanbul, Mihran Press, 1315 Hi/1896.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Abdul-Majid Fahmi Hassan, “A Guide to the History of Iraqi Liwas - Kirkuk Liwa”, vol.2, Dijla Press, Baghdad, 1947, pp 284 and 301.

[7] Enc. Islam, s.v. “Kirkuk”.

[8] Brian Cooper Bush. “Britain, India and Arabs” p.40, and Marian Kent, “Oil and Empire” p.120. Nouri Talabany, “Southern Kurdistan and International Law” in “An Analysis of the Legal Rights of the Kurdish People” pub. By The Ahmed Foundation for Kurdish Studies, Virginia, USA, 2000, p.96.

[9] Nouri Talabany, Ibid.

[10] Nouri Talabany, “Arabization of the Kirkuk Region”, pub. In Sweden by Kurdistan Studies Press, 2001, p.34.

[11] Nouri Talabany, “La Politique de l’Arabisation de la Region de Kirkuk”, Speech given at Green Party of France Conference on Economic Sanctions and Human Rights in Iraq, Assemble National, Paris, 5 February 2001

[12] Walid Hamdi, “Kurds and Kurdistan in British Documents”, a documentary study published in Arabic in London, 1992, p.186.

[13] Jabar Kader, “Kirkuk: A Century and a half of The Policy of Turkisization and Arabization (in Arabic), Iraqi File Magazine No.99, March 2000, p.42.

[14] Abdul Majid Fahmi Hassan, Ibid., p.54.

[15] Ahmed Najmadin, “Population Conditions in Iraq”, Cairo, Arab Studies Institute, 1970, p. 109. In 1921, when Britain occupied Iraq, they estimated the ethnic composition of Kirkuk as 75,000 Kurds, 35,000 Turks, 10,000 Arabs, 1000 Jews and 600 Childo/Assyrians. The 1957 census gave the figures as 48.3% Kurds, 28.2% Arabs, 21.2% Turkmans.

[16] Nouri Talabany, “Arabization of the Kirkuk Region”, p. 35.

[17] Ibid. pp. 36-38.

[18] Ibid. The text of these memoranda is published in Appendix II, p 104 - 113.

[19] Nouri Talabany, “Kurdo/Turkman Relations”, “Ra'yat-ul Islam” Magazine, Vol.1, Year 15, No.1, March 2001, p.2.

[20] Nouri Talabany, “Arabization of the Kirkuk Region”, p.43.

[21] Ibid. P.51.

[22] This was my experience when I was made redundant for political reasons from my post as Professor of Law at Baghdad University in December 1982. I was not allowed to return to my city of Kirkuk where my family has lived for six generations and was obliged to settle in the city of Arbil. The lorry driver who took our belongings from Baghdad to Arbil, via Kirkuk, later told me that a Security Service agent from the entry checkpoint of Kirkuk accompanied him until the exit checkpoint to be certain that he had left Kirkuk!

[23] Ibid. P.66.

[24] Al Hayat newspaper of 29th September 2000.

[25] The text of this memorandum can be found in “Arabization of the Kirkuk Region” by Nouri Talabany, published in Sweden by the Kurdistan Studies Press, 2001,p.131.

Who Owns Kirkuk? The Kurdish Case

2007-08-14T04:21:00.000-07:00

by Nouri Talabany
Middle East Quarterly
Winter 2007

Kirkuk is an essential part of Iraqi Kurdistan. While Kirkuk's demography has been in flux in recent decades, this is largely a result of ethnic cleansing campaigns implemented by Saddam Hussein's Baathist regime. Free from Baathist restrictions, many Kurdish refugees have returned to their homes in the city and its immediate environs. While many diplomats and analysts may be tempted to delay decisions about the final status of Kirkuk—whether it should remain as it is or join Iraq's Kurdistan Region—any delay could be counterproductive to the goals of peace and stability.

A Mixed City

Historically, the majority of the city's population was Kurdish and Turkoman. The Turkomans traced their families back to the Ottoman era. Later, Arabs began to settle in the region. Writing of the ethnic composition of the city, the Ottoman encyclopedist Shamsadin Sami, author of the Qamus al-A'lam, found that, "Three quarters of the inhabitants of Kirkuk are Kurds and the rest are Turkomans, Arabs, and others. Seven hundred and sixty Jews and 460 Chaldeans also reside in the city."[1]

The Kurds predate other resident groups; the northern and eastern districts of the cities have been traditionally Kurdish. Turkomans later migrated to the region. According to the Encyclopedia of Islam, the local Kurdish population in Kirkuk was joined by a Turkoman minority as far back as the ninth century c.e. when caliphs installed Turkoman garrisons in the region.[2] In his history of the various Iraqi provinces, Iraqi historian Abdul Majid Fahmi Hassan placed the Turkoman migration in the mid-seventeenth century when Ottoman Sultan Murad IV wrested the region from Iranian control. As Murad returned to Istanbul, he left army units in position to control the strategic route linking Baghdad and Anatolia; the Iraqi Turkomans descended from these troops.[3] Prominent Turkoman families in Kirkuk, such as the Neftçiler and Awçi, trace their ancestry to Murad's troops;[4] moreover, the prominent ethnic Arab Tikriti family also traces their presence in the region to Murad's soldiers and the sultan's gift of land in and around Kirkuk as a reward for their military service against the Iranians.[5]

In the late Ottoman period, Kirkuk was the administrative center of the vilayet (province) of Sharazur. In 1879, it became a sanjak (district) within the vilayet of Mosul. Further changes occurred in the region in 1918 when the British army occupied the Mosul vilayet and created a new Arbil governorate. In 1921, the British estimated the population of the Kirkuk region to be 75,000 Kurds, 35,000 Turkomans, 10,000 Arabs, 1,400 Jews, and 600 Chaldeans. A League of Nations Committee that visited the Mosul vilayet in 1925 estimated that the Kurds comprised 63 percent of Kirkuk's population, the Turkomans, 19 percent, and the Arabs, 18 percent.[6]
Many Kurds grew crops and raised livestock near the streams and wells in the northern and eastern parts of the Kirkuk region, but after the 1927 discovery of oil, Arab, Assyrian, and Armenian migration into the city of Kirkuk itself accelerated.[7] From 1935, Arab families migrated to the nearby Hawija plain, southwest of Kirkuk, after the Iraqi government launched a large-scale irrigation project to open the drier southwestern portion of the region to agriculture. Other Arabs settled in Kirkuk as civil servants or serving as officers and soldiers in the Second Division of the Iraqi army, most of which was stationed in Kirkuk.

Because there was no census taken in Iraq until 1947, however, such figures are estimates, and the 1947 census itself is of little help because it gives no precise details of the ethnic composition of the population. However, the 1957 census—widely acknowledged as the most valid because it was the least politicized—broke down population by mother tongue, finding Kirkuk was 48.3 percent Kurd, 28.2 percent Arab, 21.4 percent Turkoman, and the rest Chaldean, Assyrian, or other.[8]

While demography might shift with time, Kirkuk's various communities have a long history of coexistence. Politically, Kurds have a long tradition of leadership in Kirkuk. On a national level, most Kirkuk representatives in the Iraqi parliament were Kurds and a smaller number of Turkomans. Local Arab representatives entered the parliament after settlement of the Hawija region. In the late Ottoman era, the sultan's governors mostly nominated Turkomans as mayors although, on certain occasions, Kurds also held the position. Later, during the monarchy, Kirkuk's mayors were mostly Kurds from the Talabany family.[9] It was only during the late Ottoman era and the Iraqi monarchy that many Turkomans became mayors. The first Arab mayor took office in 1969 when the Baathist regime appointed Muzhir al-Tikriti.
Until 1955, Kirkuk had just one high school, and the majority of the students had Kurdish and Turkoman backgrounds with smaller numbers of Arabs, Assyrians, Chaldeans, and Armenians. Most Arab students were the children of civil servants, military personnel, or employees of the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC).

By long-standing tradition, the Kurds, Turkomans, Chaldeans, and Jews have had their own cemeteries. The Arabs, being a minority, buried their dead in the Turkoman cemeteries. However, in 1991, Saddam Hussein's government created special cemeteries for Arab settlers and banned Arab Shi‘ites from taking their dead back to Najaf for burial in order to bolster the Arab claim to the city. The Baathist regime subsequently began to rewrite Kurdish tombstone inscriptions with Arabic in order to retroactively alter the demography.

Ethnic Cleansing

The Baathists sough to implement their Arab nationalism by force. In June 1963, the short-lived Baathist regime of Ali Saleh al-Sa'adi destroyed thirteen Kurdish villages around Kirkuk and expelled the population of another thirty-four Kurdish villages in the Dubz district near Kirkuk, replacing them with Arabs from central and southern Iraq.

After the Baath party consolidated power in 1963, the National Guard (al-Haras al-Qawmi), recruited Arab Baathists and Turkomans who systematically attacked ethnic Kurds. Between 1963 and 1988, the Baathist regime destroyed 779 Kurdish villages in the Kirkuk region—razing 493 primary schools, 598 mosques, and 40 medical clinics.[10] In order to prevent the return of the Kurds, they burned farms and orchards, confiscated cattle, blew up wells, and obliterated cemeteries. In all, this ethnic cleansing campaign forced 37,726 Kurdish families out of their villages. Given the average rural Kurdish family size of between five and seven people, this policy forced over 200,000 Kurds to flee the region. The Kurds were not the regime's only victims. During the Iran-Iraq war, the central government destroyed about ten Shi‘ite Turkoman villages south of Kirkuk.

The Iraqi government also compelled urban Kurds to leave Kirkuk. It transferred oil company employees, civil servants, and teachers to southern and central Iraq. The Baathist government renamed streets and schools in Arabic and forced businesses to adopt Arab names. Kurds could only sell real estate to Arabs; non-Arabs could not purchase property in the city. The government allocated thousands of new residential units for Arabs only. Ethnic cleansing intensified after the 1991 Kuwait war when the Republican Guards crushed a short-lived uprising. In 1996, the regime passed an "identity law" to force Kurds and other non-Arabs to register as Arab. The government expelled from the region anyone who refused. In 1997, the Iraqi government demolished Kirkuk's historic citadel with its mosques and ancient church. Human Rights Watch estimated that between 1991 and 2003, the Iraqi government expelled between 120,000 and 200,000 non-Arabs from Kirkuk and its environs.[11]

In September 1999, the U.S. State Department reported that the Iraqi government had displaced approximately 900,000 citizens throughout Iraq. The report continued to describe how "[l]ocal officials in the south have ordered the arrest of any official or citizen who provides employment, food, or shelter to newly arriving Kurds."[12]

A New Beginning for Kirkuk?

In April 2003, coalition forces and the Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga liberated Kirkuk from Baathist control. Many victims of Saddam's ethnic cleansing campaign sought to return to the region, only to be prevented by U.S. authorities. Many remain in tent-city limbo. Article 58 of the March 8, 2004 Transitional Administrative Law[13] sought to settle disputes in Kirkuk by means of an Iraqi Property Claims Commission and "other relevant bodies." In practice, however, successive Iraqi governments have done little, creating suspicion among many Iraqi Kurds as to the central government's intentions. The uncertainty over Kirkuk's status has impeded local development and sidelined the issue of refugee resettlement.
Article 140 of the new Iraqi constitution has adopted Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law, which necessitates the normalization of the situation in Kirkuk by which the legislature meant the assistance of the return of internally displaced people and their reclamation of seized property. Arabs installed in the region should be helped to return to southern and central Iraq, should they so desire. The four subdistricts of Kifri, Chemchemal, Kalar, and Tuz-Khurmatu annexed to neighboring governorates by the regime in 1976 should be returned to the governorate of Kirkuk. Article 140 also states that a local census must be organized and a referendum held to decide the future of the province. The set deadline for the implementation of this article is December 2007. However, if Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki does not implement the article within the allocated time, ethnic and sectarian unrest could explode in Kirkuk, the effects rippling throughout Iraq.

A report by the International Crisis Group proposes that the Iraqi government invite the U.N. Security Council "to appoint an envoy to start negotiations to designate the Kirkuk governorate as a stand-alone, federal region for an interim period" and recommends postponing the constitutionally-mandated referendum because of the threat that it could further exacerbate an already uncertain security situation.[14]

There is no need for another envoy. With many Arab League nations and Turkey opposed to the expansion of Kurdish self-rule, a U.N. envoy would not have the confidence of most of Kirkuk's residents. Nor should outside organizations, however well-meaning, delay implementation of Article 140. A wide swath of Iraqi society accepted the constitution after extensive consultation. And, on August 9, the Iraqi government nominated a high committee chaired by the Minister of Justice to implement Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution without delay.

Until the December 2007 referendum, which the U.N. has the expertise to organize, it will be impossible to know whether local residents wish Kirkuk to be absorbed into the Kurdistan Regional Government. Many Kurds do, but others are afraid of being pushed aside by established patronage networks and political machines imposed from outside the city.
Rather than destabilize the region, formal resolution of the dispute over Kirkuk's status should calm the city. Various ethnic and sectarian communities coexisted peacefully in Kirkuk until Abdul-Karim Qasim's 1958 coup d'état. The central government in Baghdad rather than local politics fueled most subsequent conflicts. Any census is sure to confirm the majority status of Kurds inside Kirkuk. They will demand the right to have their voice heard through the ballot box. But Kurdish empowerment through the democratic process need not mean disenfranchisement for the local Arabs and Turkoman communities. There is no reason why the various communities within Kirkuk cannot coexist peacefully again.

Nouri Talabany is the author of several books and articles about Iraqi Kurdish history. He is currently an independent member of parliament in the Iraqi Kurdistan region.

[1] Shamsadin Sami, Qamus al-A'lam (Istanbul: Mihran Press, 1896), see "Kirkuk."
[2] Encyclopedia of Islam (Leiden: Brill, 2004), s.v. "Kirkuk."
[3] Abdul Majid Fahmi Hasan, Dalil Tarikh Mashahir al-Alwiya al-Iraqiya [A Guide to the History of Iraqi Liwas-Kirkuk Liwa], vol. II, (Baghdad: Dijla Press, 1947), p. 58.
[4] Ibid., pp. 284, 301.
[5] Ibid., p. 289.
[6] Jabar Qadir, "Kirkuk: karnun wa nisf min siyasat at-tatrik w'al ta'arib," Al-Malaful Iraqi (London), no. 99, Mar. 2000, p. 42.
[7] Hasan, Dalil Tarikh Mashahir al-Alwiya al-Iraqiya, p. 55.
[8] Census Registration Records of 1957, Iraqi Ministry of Interior, the General Population Directorate.
[9] Nouri Talabany, Arabization of the Kirkuk Region, 3rd ed. (Arbil: Aras Publisher, 2004), p. 21.
[10] Nouri Talabany, Arabization of the Kirkuk Region (Uppsala, Sweden: Kurdistan Studies Press, 2001), p. 94.
[11] "III: Forced Expulsions," Iraq: Forcible Expulsion of Ethnic Minorities, vol. 15, no. 3(E) (New York: Human Rights Watch, Mar. 2003).
[12] "Repression of the Iraqi People," Saddam Hussein's Iraq, U.S. Department of State, Sept. 13, 1999 (updated Feb. 23, 2000), accessed Aug. 7, 2006; Al-Hayat (London), Sept. 29, 2000.
[13] "Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period," Coalition Provisional Authority, Baghdad, Mar. 8, 2004.
[14] "Iraq and the Kurds: The Brewing Battle over Kirkuk," Middle East Report, no. 56, International Crisis Group, Brussels and Amman, July 18, 2006.

The Re-establishment of the University of Kirkuk on a New Basis

2003-08-24T16:09:00.000-07:00

24 August 2003
KurdishMedia.com - By Dr Nouri Talabany

The establishing of the University of Kirkuk some years ago by the Ba’athist regime must be regarded with suspicion, for it was founded by a regime which, for the previous 35 years, had systematically practised a policy of ethnic cleansing in this city and its environs which was contrary to all human principles. It was not from a desire to create a seat of learning or to develop the region of Kirkuk that the university was founded, but from a determination to extend and enforce its policy of ethnic cleansing there.

The first Faculty to be opened was that of Law. We all know that the one thing, above all else, for which that regime had no respect, was the law. This Faculty was staffed by so-called professors of law who were all Baa’athists, as were most, if not all, of the students. Its obvious purpose was to act as an instrument of propaganda for Ba’athist ideology in the region and to create a framework for Ba’athist operations there.

Normally, no university anywhere in the world is opened until a detailed study has been made of the city or area of its proposed location. Such a study takes into consideration every aspect of the life of the area, especially the social, economic and cultural aspects, and the role of the university is to develop all of these. But the Ba’athist regime, especially in the Kirkuk region where it had pursued a policy of ethnic cleansing for decades, saw the founding of the university as a means of intensifying this policy. We should question why a Faculty of Law should take priority over one that would serve the purposes of the oil industry. Kirkuk is, after all, the main city of the oil industry and needs such a Faculty. The same question could be asked about a Faculty of Agriculture. The area boasts hundreds of thousands of acres of fertile land between the Lower Zab and the Sirwan rivers and the agricultural industry there needs to be developed and modernised. The city and region of Kirkuk was in far greater need of Faculties to serve the oil and agriculture industries than of a Faculty of Law which was only created for ideological purposes.

As a Professor of Law I was, naturally, delighted to find a Faculty of Law in my city. However, I could accept neither the reasons for its founding nor the way in which it was staffed by Ba’athists. I constantly criticized the universities of Iraqi Kurdistan for opening many Faculties without properly qualified, specialist professors and technicians, and without adequate laboratories. Since 1991, I have also opposed the opening of a private Faculty of Law in liberated Iraqi Kurdistan as the Ba’athists had done elsewhere. The one existing Faculty of Law at the University of Salahadin in Arbil was already under-staffed. When two more universities were founded in Sulaimani and Dohuk, some Faculties were opened with insufficient staff. Sadly, the reason for the rapid founding of all these Faculties was the conflict between the two main political parties who were dividing the liberated part of Iraqi Kurdistan.

I believe it to be vital that, following the unification of the two Kurdish administrations, a special committee be set up to examine all these Faculties and to try to make Kurdish the language of instruction in the Faculties of Law. In the Faculties of the Human Sciences, e.g. medicine, pharmacy, engineering, etc. English must continue to be used.

For this reason, I propose that no new students should be accepted into the Faculty of Law of the University of Kirkuk and that existing students should be diverted to other such Faculties. This was done at the University of Basra when its Faculty of Law was closed at the beginning of the seventies. In the future, when we have properly qualified professors of law to staff it, it may be possible to open a new Faculty of Law that will produce highly qualified professionals.

While proposing the creation of two new Faculties in Kirkuk University for the oil industry through all its stages of production, and for agriculture, in which English will be the language of instruction, I propose, also, the setting up of a Faculty of Languages. We are all aware that the city of Kirkuk is home to communities of Kurds, Turkmans, Arabs and Assyrio/Chaldeans. The children of these communities have the right to receive a proper education in their own languages. In my opinion, the Faculty of Languages should include Departments for the study of all these tongues so as to prepare teachers for their schools. It must also include a Department of English, as it will be taught as a foreign language in the schools.

Perhaps I may remind you that, after the uprising of March 1991 in Iraqi Kurdistan, in a written proposal to the ‘Kurdistan Front’, which was the umbrella for all the political parties in Iraqi Kurdistan, I made the following suggestions:

1. The name of the University of Salahadin in Arbil, which was the only university in Iraqi Kurdistan at that time, should be changed to the University of Kurdistan and all faculties concerned with pure science should remain there.

2. All the Faculties of Human Science, such as Literature, Law, Economics and Administration at the University of Salahadin should be transferred to the city of Sulaimani to form the basis for a new university specialising in the Human Sciences. Throughout history, Sulaimani has been a centre of Kurdish culture with a reputation for the correct use of the Kurdish language. Basing these Faculties there would encourage the proper use of Kurdish as the main language of instruction. At present, in every university in Iraqi Kurdistan, teaching in most Faculties of Human Science is still conducted in Arabic.

3. The Faculty of Agriculture at Salahadin University, which was closed by the Ba’athist regime, should be re-opened and should form the basis of a new university in the city of Dohuk specialising in agriculture, forestry, irrigation and the tobacco industry. Tobacco is one of the main products of Iraqi Kurdistan.

4. On the liberation of Kirkuk city, a new Technical University should be established there, as Kirkuk is the centre of the oil industry. In 1991, even though Kirkuk was still controlled by the Ba’athist regime, was not a part of the Safe Haven and was still subject to the Ba’athist’s policy of ethnic cleansing, I dreamt of a time when it would be liberated.

We do not need another university in Kirkuk, which operates in exactly the same way as the other Iraqi universities. As Kirkuk is the centre of the oil industry, it needs a university with Faculties specialising mainly in oil and agriculture.

The development of Iraqi Kurdistan requires such specialised universities, able to undertake intensive research into the economic, social, cultural and scientific aspects of life there and to form links with universities in more developed countries, especially in the west. These universities should make contact with Kurdish academics in the outside world who could return, either permanently, or for visits, and contribute to the development of the universities of Iraqi Kurdistan. They have a great deal of knowledge and expertise to offer and could forge links between the Kurdish universities and their own universities or academic establishments.

It is to be hoped that the reconstructing of the University of Kirkuk on a new basis and the use of English as the language of instruction will make a major contribution to the reconstruction of the Kirkuk region that is now the most under-developed part of Iraqi Kurdistan. We hope, also, that the new university will contribute to establishing a new relationship between all the communities of Kirkuk.

* An extract from this article was published, in Kurdish, in the newspaper ‘Kurdistani Nwe’ on 18th June 2003.

Observations on the proposal to establish a property claims commission in the Kirkuk region

2003-04-24T15:55:00.000-07:00

The Kurdish view on the constitutional future of Iraq - Part II

2002-10-10T15:57:00.000-07:00

10 October 2002
KurdishMedia.com - By Dr Nouri Talabany

Chapter Two

The Executive Authority

Section One
The Region’s Chief Executive

Article (69)

The Iraqi Kurdistan Region’s Parliament shall choose a Chief Executive for the Region who shall serve for a period of four years after taking the oath of office. His term of office cannot be renewed more than once.

Article (70)

In addition to the provisions of Article 50 of this Constitution, the candidate for the post of the Region’s Chief Executive must meet the following requirements:

1. He/she must be a citizen of Iraqi Kurdistan and permanently resident there.

2. He/she must be accorded all civil and political rights and must have reached forty years of age.

Article (71)

1. The date of the election of the Region’s Chief Executive shall be set by Parliament and announced through the media.

2. Every citizen of the Region who meets the requirements specified in Article 70 above has the right to stand as a candidate by submitting a written application to the Speaker of Parliament within fifteen days of the announcement of the date of the election. It must be signed and endorsed by ten members of Parliament and supported by the appropriate legal documents.

3. A Commission appointed by Parliament at the time of its announcement of the date of the election for the Chief Executive shall make a decision on the applications within five days of their submission and shall notify the applicants of its decisions within two days.

4. An applicant has the right to challenge the Commission’s decision before the Iraqi Kurdistan Region’s High Court within two days of being notified of it.

5. The High Court will make a definitive decision about the challenge within two days. All candidates will be considered to have been notified of the above-mentioned decisions as from the date of their announcement on the court’s bulletin board.

Article (72)

1. Gaining a two-thirds majority in a secret ballot shall elect the Region’s Chief Executive by the Region’s Parliament.

2. In the event of a failure to elect the Chief Executive on the first ballot, and where there are two or more candidates standing for election, the second and subsequent ballots will be limited to the two candidates who received the most votes on the first ballot.

3. In the event of a failure to gain the required two-thirds majority on the second, third, fourth, and fifth ballots, which must be held within fifteen days, Parliament shall elect the Chief Executive on the sixth ballot, within three days, by a simple majority.

Article (73)

The Region’s Chief Executive shall take the oath of office before Parliament within two days of his election in the following manner: “I do solemnly swear by God that I will protect the unity of the people and territory of Iraqi Kurdistan, and that I will protect the vital interests of the people and uphold the Constitution and the law.”

Article (74)

The salary of the Region’s Chief Executive shall be set by Parliament.

Article (75)

The Region’s Chief Executive shall assume the following responsibilities:

1. Commander-in-chief of the Region’s armed forces.

2. Summoning the Region’s Parliament for regular, as well as extraordinary, sessions.

3. Appointing the Region’s Prime Minister from the majority party in Parliament in accordance with the Constitution.

4. Issuing of Decrees regarding the appointment of the Region’s Prime Minister and his Cabinet.

5. Endorsing any Regional Laws passed by Parliament within ten days of receiving them.

6. Signing death sentences or commuting such sentences to life imprisonment with hard labour.

7. Issuing special clemencies after consultation with the Region’s Supreme Legal Council.

8. Issuing Decrees, with the approval of the Region’s Cabinet, to deal with emergency situations requiring immediate action when Parliament is not in session. These Decrees have the force of law and must be presented to Parliament for ratification as soon as it reconvenes.

9. Calling general elections to elect the Region’s Parliament within fifteen days of the end of its term, or of a decision to dissolve itself.

10. Issuing Decrees regarding the appointment, dismissal, or acceptance of the resignation of high-ranking officials, judges, members of the public prosecutor’s office, or those of equal rank.

11. Selecting, appointing, dismissing, and accepting the resignation of his advisors.

Article (76)

The Prime Minister’s approval is necessary for Decrees issued by the Chief Executive.

Article (77)

The provisions of Article 56 of this Constitution are applicable to the Region’s Chief Executive while he remains in office.

Article (78)

Parliament shall elect a new Chief Executive of the Region no earlier than thirty days before the expiry of the current Chief Executive’s term of office.

Article (79)

1. If, for any reason, the Chief Executive’s position falls vacant, Parliament shall elect a new Chief Executive within thirty days. The Prime Minister shall assume the Chief Executive’s responsibilities during this period.

2. In the case of the Chief Executive’s absence or disability, the Prime Minister shall act for him for a period not exceeding three months.

3. If the Chief Executive is unable to resume his work at the end of the period specified in section two above, Parliament has the right, either to extend the time for a further three months, or to elect a new Chief Executive in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

Section Two
The Cabinet (The Government)

Article (80)

1. After consultation, the Region’s Chief Executive will appoint a member of the majority party in Parliament to form the Cabinet.

2. The Prime Minister designate shall present to Parliament the names of his Cabinet, together with his Government’s programme and policies, within a period of not more than fifteen days from the date of his appointment, to win a vote of confidence by Parliament.

Article (81)

Within seven days of winning a vote of confidence in Parliament, a Regional Decree shall appoint the Prime Minister and the Cabinet to their positions.

Article (82)

Any member of the Cabinet must be a citizen of the Region, at least thirty years of age, and must be accorded all his civil and political rights. He must not have been convicted of a non-political crime or misdemeanour, in addition to meeting all the requirements mentioned in Article 50 of this Constitution.

Article (83)

The Cabinet is the Region’s supreme executive and administrative authority and is responsible for enforcing the laws, protecting the rights and liberties of the citizens and maintaining peace and stability in the Region. It is responsible specifically for:

1. Deciding the overall policy of the Region.

2. Preparing draft legislation and introducing them to Parliament for passage into Regional Law.

3. Issuing rules and regulations in accordance with the Law.

4. Making executive and administrative decisions in accordance with the law and ensuring their enforcement.

5. Overseeing the appropriateness of the directives issued by individual ministers to facilitate the enforcement of laws and regulations.

6. Preparing the Region’s General Budget and monitoring its implementation after its approval by Parliament.

7. Preparing the economic development plan for the Region and monitoring its proper implementation after its approval by Parliament.

8. Nominating advisors and high-ranking officials, directors general, judges, and members of the public prosecutor’s office, and presenting their names to the Region’s Chief Executive to ratify their appointments by Regional Decrees.

Article (84)

Before taking office, members of the Cabinet shall take the following oath before the Region’s Chief Executive: “I do solemnly swear by God that I will protect the unity of the people and territory of Iraqi Kurdistan, and that I will protect the vital interests of the people and uphold the Constitution and the law.”

Article (85)

The provisions of Article 56 of this Constitution shall apply to the Prime Minister and the members of his Cabinet while in office.

Article (86)

1. The Prime Minister shall direct and co-ordinate the work of the ministries and monitor their performance.

2. The ministers share the responsibility to Parliament for the Cabinet’s general policies and each minister is personally responsible for his actions.

Article (87)

The minister has overall responsibility for his Ministry. He sets the policy of his Ministry within the Region’s general policy and implements it.

Article (88)

It is possible for one quarter of the members of Parliament to request a vote of confidence in the Cabinet or in one of the ministers. No vote can be taken on the issue of confidence before one week has elapsed since the introduction of it to Parliament. The voting will be public and held within two days of the completion of discussion of the issue. A vote of no confidence shall not be conclusive unless it is by a simple majority of all the members of Parliament. A vote of no confidence in the Cabinet will result in the resignation of the entire Cabinet, and a vote of no confidence in a minister will result in the resignation of that minister.

Article (89)

In the event of the death of the Prime Minister, or in other circumstances, which would render his post vacant, his deputy shall assume his responsibilities until such time as a new Prime Minister is appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

Article (90)

Ministers are accountable for any felonies or misdemeanours they commit whilst discharging, or as a result of, their responsibilities.

Article (91)

Parliament has the right to bring charges against a minister before a Special Tribunal for crimes he commits whilst discharging, or as a result of, his responsibilities. These charges must be based on a proposal by at least one-quarter of the members of Parliament. The verdict to convict shall be by a simple majority of the members of Parliament.

Article (92)

A minister who is accused shall be suspended from his post until a decision is made. He shall not be dismissed without a formal charge or the instigation of legal proceedings. A minister’s trial, the procedures of the trial, its safeguards and the punishments, shall be in accordance with the law. The provisions of this law shall also apply to the deputy ministers and others of equal rank.

Chapter Three
The Judiciary

Article (93)

No one is above the law and the judiciary must be allowed to administer justice without interference. Judges are free to make their decisions in a manner that would enable them to discharge their duties in the best way possible.

Article (94)

The rule of law applies to everyone in its general and particular terms.

Article (95)

The right to a fair trial is guaranteed to all. The law defines the procedures necessary for exercising this right

Article (96)

The law shall determine the manner of establishing courts, their types, their hierarchy, and the areas of their responsibility.

Article (97)

Court sessions shall be public unless public welfare dictates, in the opinion of the court or at the request of the prosecution, that they be held in secret to preserve of public order or to maintain decorum.

Article (98)

The courts’ decisions and verdicts shall be pronounced in the name of the people.

Article (99)

Extraordinary Tribunals shall not be established unless there is the threat of an external attack on the Region or a serious threat to its internal security. They will be established by a Regional Decree from the Region’s Chief Executive at the suggestion of the Cabinet. The work of these Tribunals shall cease with the end of the unusual situation that necessitated them. Law will regulate all this.

Article (100)

The Public Prosecutor’s office shall represent the public in defending justice and in protecting individual and family freedoms and property in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region.

Part Four
The Supreme Legal Council

Article (101)

The Supreme Legal Council of the Region is the body that the Region’s Chief Executive and the Prime Minister will consult on matters relating to the Constitution and its provisions. Specifically, it looks into:

1. Proposals concerning the amendment of one or more of the Articles of the Constitution.

2. The drafting of bills, rules and regulations.

3. Legal matters referred to it by the Region’s Chief Executive, Prime Minister, and ministers.

Article (102)

The Council shall be composed of five members of senior rank appointed by a Regional Decree based on a proposal by the Region’s Cabinet. They will be chosen from among the outstanding jurists of the Region known for their competence, honesty, integrity, and dedication.

Article (103)

Holding membership of the Council and membership of Parliament or the Cabinet concurrently is prohibited.

Part Five

General Provisions

Article (104)

This Constitution shall be effective after its enactment by Parliament by a two-thirds majority vote.

Article (105)

The Region’s Cabinet or one-third of the members of Parliament have the right to request the amendment of one or more articles of this Constitution provided that the number of articles to be amended, and the reasons, are mentioned in the request.

Article (106)

The proposal to amend the Constitution shall be presented to the Region’s Supreme Legal Council for its views, before being presented to Parliament.

Article (107)

Any amendment to the Constitution requires the approval of a two-thirds majority of members of Parliament.

Article (108)

The provisions of the legislation in effect before the adoption of this Constitution remain in effect in the Region until abolished or amended by a decision of Parliament, with the exception of any legislation shown to be incompatible with the provisions of this Constitution.

Article (109)

The laws, rules and regulations shall be published in the Region’s official register/gazette and will be effective as from the date of their publication, or as from the date specified in those same laws, rules and regulations.

Concerning the Proposed Constitution

For the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (*)

Federalism is regarded as the best system for democratic states, which are made up of a multiplicity of nations. This principle of federalism was unanimously endorsed by the elected parliament of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR) on the 4th October 1992. The decision was supposed to have been followed by the complementary and necessary step of a legal constitution for the Iraqi Kurdistan Region.

However, this poses the question of whether it is possible to draw up a constitution for the Iraqi Kurdistan Region before there is a federal constitution for Iraq as a whole. This would be a reasonable question even for a country which had not suffered the harrowing events and brutal tragedies which have prevailed in Iraq, where a succession of military coups d’etat have ensured the continuing power of dictatorial regimes. For decades, the Kurdish people have borne a far greater share of oppression and racist atrocities than the rest of the Iraqi population.

This has been particularly true since Saddam Hussein’s regime intensified its oppression by the use of chemical weapons, and by the implementation of the genocidal Anfal Campaign in which more than 182,000 innocent Kurds perished and more than 4,000 villages and dozens of small Kurdish towns were razed to the ground. This was accompanied by the enforced, mass expulsion of Kurdish populations from their homelands and by the ethnic cleansing of their areas, as occurred in that part of Kurdistan which still remain under the control of the dictatorial regime of Iraq.

The Kurdish Parliament adopted the principle of federalism for two main reasons: firstly, to safeguard the people of Iraqi Kurdistan from further atrocity, as the federal system contains provisions available in neither decentralized nor autonomous systems and, secondly, to emphasize the desire of the people of Iraqi Kurdistan to maintain the integrity of Iraq, alongside the Iraqi Arabs, whilst exercising their right to self-determination. For this reason, the Parliament has demanded neither independence nor confederation.

In its demand for the establishment of a democratic, federal state which fully protects human rights, the Parliament of Kurdistan was inspired by the examples of some federal systems in the West, whilst taking into account the specific issues relating to Iraq and the particularity of the Kurdish people as a distinct nation with its own language, culture and heritage, and its legitimate ambition to enjoy the right of self-determination. These principles should form the basis of any future Constitution of a federal, democratic Iraq in which the Iraqi political parties are clearly defined. The establishment of such a state must be based on a contractual agreement between Kurdistan and the Arab Iraqi Region.

As the legally authorized representative of the people, the Parliament of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region has adopted the principle of federalism and has proposed it to Arab Iraq. If the authorized Arab representative body were to adopt this principle, it would represent a major and positive step towards a bright future for Iraq. However, should they refuse it, no other arrangement could be imposed on the Iraqi Kurdistan Region by the Central Government, since it holds no mandate to enforce any measures on the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. It would be contrary to the right to self-determination for the Kurdish people in Iraq, which is an inviolable entitlement that should, and must, be exercised by the Kurds alone.

In an important development in the recent political history of Iraq, this principle of federalism and the right to self-determination as a constitutional framework for post-Saddam Iraq, was accepted and endorsed in October 1992, by the Iraqi National Council (INC) which was, at that time, the umbrella organization representing all the main politically effective factions of the Iraqi opposition. There are, of course, other groups in the Iraqi opposition who do not accept it and who object either directly or indirectly. They do not, however, represent active of effective parties amongst the Iraqi opposition and, in any case, they are a minority. Democracy accepts the views of the majority.

It is important to emphasize that the establishment of federalism as a legal, contractual agreement between two parties, Kurdistan and the Arabic part of Iraq, would mean that both Regions would have equal rights, irrespective of geographic or demographic size or economic capabilities, and must enjoy extensive powers. The concept of federalism implies complete equality on both sides of the federal union, including equal participation in the central administration of the Federal State and equal membership of the Upper House. The latter would form one of two main pillars of the central legislative authority with wide powers to decide common policies of the Federal State.

The administration of the Federal State must be based on democratic elections and on the protection of all aspects of human rights. To ensure this, a High Court must be created, accessible to all parties, groups and individuals and its decisions must be binding on all. All these points, as well as a definition of the boundaries of the two Regions, must be clearly specified in any future Iraqi Constitution.

Here we must return to the question: is it possible to legislate a Constitution for the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, though now free of the regime, before there is a new Constitution for Iraq, especially since the Ba’ath party is still in power? Should we wait until this regime is removed and replaced by another, which believes in democracy and federalism? If so, then for how long should the Parliament of Iraqi Kurdistan wait before legislating a Constitution for the Region, especially since there is nothing clear on the political horizon to suggest that the regime is likely to fall, even though several years have elapsed since the Gulf War and despite its internal, regional and international isolation and the economic embargo imposed on it? Is it logical that every institution of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, including the Parliament, Regional Government and judicial bodies, should remain without a Constitution to regulate their authority and power on the pretext that no Constitution exists for the whole of Iraq? It should be remembered here, that the power to legislate a constitution for the Iraqi Kurdistan Region belongs to the Regional Parliament and the people of Kurdistan alone, and not with the Federal Parliament or the whole population of Iraq.

For all the foregoing reasons, we believe that we must proceed with legislating such a Constitution without further delay. This is now being urged by all Kurdish lawyers and legal and judicial authorities, as well as by a large number of members of the Kurdish Parliament. The sad events of May 1994 and later, which led to the armed conflict between the two main Kurdish political parties, served only to prove that the lack of a Constitution for the Region ensured that only the dictatorial regime in Baghdad and other neighbouring states, benefited. It seems that the fear of being accused of separatism - an accusation made against the Kurds for decades by the Iraqi Regime and other neighbouring countries, as well as from certain sections of the Iraqi opposition - has caused the Kurdish leaders to abandon the idea of a Constitution despite the pressure by Kurdish jurists mentioned before.

In mid-1992, as a personal initiative, after studying most of the federal systems in the world and their development, I began to draft a Constitution for the Iraqi Kurdistan Region in the hope that it would stimulate discussion among the legal profession and political parties. This document was eventually passed to an official Legal Committee in Kurdistan, of which I was a member, before being presented to the Kurdish Government and Parliament in its final draft. Today, I will attempt to highlight some of the bases and contents of the proposed Constitution. The document contains a preamble, and five parts in 109 articles.

The Preamble summarizes the conditions prevailing in Kurdistan at the end of the First World War and explains how Kurdistan, the Arab countries and Armenia, - all part of the Ottoman Empire - were specified by the American President, Woodrow Wilson, in his proposal to the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919, in which he asked for them all to be put under an international mandate. It mentions the Sevres Treaty of 1920, which agreed, to the formation of a Kurdish state from Northern and Southern Kurdistan. It also explains how the Treaty of Lausanne excised these decisions in 1923 following the assumption of power in Turkey by General Mustafa Kemal. Britain, which at that time held a mandate on Iraq, supported the newly created Iraqi State in annexing the Mosul Wilayet to it as large quantities of oil had been discovered there. So Kurdish oil became the principal reason for the division of Kurdistan. From then on, successive Iraqi regimes have used this source of wealth to destroy, rather than to build Kurdistan. Most of Iraq’s oil is produced in Kirkuk, the town from which I come; a town which the regime has turned into an Arab settlement after the expulsion of most of its Kurdish, Turkmans and Assyrians inhabitants and the settling of tens of thousands of Arab families there, with massive financial and other privileges.

Also described in the Preamble is the joint declaration, in an official document, of the British and Iraqi governments on the 24th of December 1922, of their recognition of the right of the Kurds to enjoy wide autonomy, including the creation of Kurdish Government within the newly created state of Iraq. It now seems that this declaration, which was never acted upon, was simply a ploy to persuade the Kurds to join the Kingdom of Iraq. The tragedies and atrocities suffered by the Kurds ever since Southern Kurdistan was made part of Iraq in December, 1926, especially from 1963 onwards, mass expulsions aimed at changing the demographic character of the Region, and the systematic attempts to exterminate the Kurdish people of Iraq, are also described. It points out that the United Nations Charter supports the Kurdish people in their claim to the right to self-determination. It states also that recognition of this right does not necessarily mean its separation from Iraq, but rather reinforces the concept of participating, with the Arabs of Iraq, in a free union within a democratic, federal and non-totalitarian state. The Preamble concludes with the statement “the enjoyment by the people of Kurdistan of their constitutional rights must be regarded as a pre-requisite of the federal system”.

The main body of the Constitution consists of five parts, which deal, principally, with the nature of the political system in the IKR and its relationship with the central authorities, civil rights and freedoms, the regulation of the Regional Authorities and the remit of the Supreme Legal Council. The fifth part deals with some general provisions. I give here a brief explanation of some of its main points relating to the peculiar circumstances of the IKR and its relationship with the Central Authorities.

Definition of the borders of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region:

The first article of the draft Constitution states that the IKR includes the Governorates of Arbil, Duhok, Sulaimani and Kirkuk as recognized by its administrative borders prior to 1968, in addition to the Kurdish districts and sub-districts of Mosul, Diyalah and Kut. This definition may appear strange to those unacquainted with Iraqi affairs during the latter part of this century. For instance, the definition relating to the Kirkuk Governorate is not without good reason. Ever since the Ba’ath party assumed power in 1968, they have pursued a systematic campaign to change the demography of this Governorate where most of Iraq’s oil is produced. Their policies have included:

- Changing the name of the Governorate from Kirkuk to the Arabic name of Al Tamim (following the nationalization of the oil industry) so as to obscure its historic name.

- Annexing four of the seven districts of Kirkuk and linking them with other, adjacent Governorates so that the Kurds become a minority in the Kirkuk Governorate.

- Forcibly expelling tens of thousands of Kurdish, Turkman and Assyrian families and replacing them with Arab families brought from central and southern Iraq who enjoyed incentives and privileges in housing and employment and were given financial rewards.

- Forcibly deporting all Kurdish farmers from 779 villages in the Governorate of Kirkuk and settling Arab tribes in some of these villages who were armed and given all the agricultural land there.

The same methods were used in all Kurdish districts and sub-districts within the Governorates of Mosul, Diyalah and Kut. It is, therefore, essential that these actions should be reversed and that the Kirkuk region, as well as the other Kurdish areas stills under the control of the Iraqi regime, must become part of the IKR. We could have asked to return to the well-documented historical and geographical facts, including those from some Arab authorities, to define the borders of the IKR, but in order to avoid the charge of separatism we chose to use the official borders of the Governorate as they were before the policy of ethnic cleansing began to be practised.

In the Accord of the 11th of March 1970, between the Kurds and the Central Government, a decision on the fate of the Kirkuk Governorate, which was under the control of the regime, was postponed in order that a special Census would be taken there in a specified time. During this time, the regime implemented its policy of ethnic cleansing there, contrary to that Accord.

However, even with the demographic changes resulting from this policy, it became clear that any Census held there would not be in the regime’s favour. For this reason, the Census was never organized and this led to the armed conflict between Kurds and the regime, which re-commenced in March 1974. From that time to the present day, the regime’s policy of ethnic cleansing has been intensified in all regions under its control, which is why the Kurds refuse to accept the resulting demographic changes. The only basis for the definition of Kurdistan’s borders must be the Official Census of 1957.

Guarantees for the Continuing Existence and the Future of the IKR:

The Kurds have suffered greatly under the various Iraqi regimes, particularly since 1963. This has resulted in a lack of confidence, which will continue for a long time to come. It is, therefore, crucial that the Region should have solid guarantees, secure enough to prevent any possible attempts by the Central Government to threaten it, to interfere illegally in its affairs or even to abolish it. To this end, the proposed Constitution states that the Region, or any part of it, cannot be abolished or joined with another Region without the consent of its people. It also states that deploying Kurdish armed forces outside the Region, or sending Iraqi armed forces into the Region, without the written agreement of the Regional Government of Kurdistan, is illegal. This is to prevent the IKR being subject to threats of attempts of forced military change by the Central Government.

Definition of the Financial Status of the IKR:

Recognition of the existence of the Region and of its constitutional power will be incomplete if the IKR does not have its own financial resources by imposing its own taxes and excise duties. Therefore, Article 13 states that it is the responsibility of the Regional Parliament alone to identify the circumstances and amounts of both regional and central taxes and excise duties within the IKR. A certain percentage of these taxes collected from within the IKR must be allocated to the Regional Budget. It is also necessary to allocate a percentage of the Central Government Budget to the Regional Budget, which is to be fixed at at least 25%, which represents the ratio of the population of Kurdistan to that of the whole of Iraq. This is not excessive given the destruction suffered by Kurdistan for decades, which have resulted in virtually complete economic paralysis. In return, the Constitution states that the wealth of the IKR, including oil and minerals, will not be for the Region alone but will be shared equally between it and the Central Government. This demonstrates clearly that the Kurds wish to base their relationship on mutual co-existence and not on economic gain.

The Iraqi regime and some of the so-called Iraqi opposition who persist in claiming that these resources of oil in the Region must be allocated solely to the Central Government, are, in fact, attempting to base the relationship between Kurds and Arabs on economic domination. This is also the reason for their insistence that the Kirkuk region must remain under the control of the Central Government or have special status, contrary to the historical and geographical evidence that it is part of Kurdistan.

Definition of Remits and Responsibilities of Central and Regional Authorities:

Most federal constitutions are inclined to define these for the central authorities, leaving the rest as regional remits, and this is what the proposed Constitution does. For central authorities, these were defined as matters relating to foreign policy, international relations, defence, issuance of national currency, citizenship, customs and excise and the administration of ports, international airports, postage and central telecommunications.

This is a summary of the main content of the proposed Constitution for the IKR. The remaining articles do not differ from those of similar constitutions in the civilized world, particularly those relating to civil rights and the regulation of the relationship between legislative, executive and judicial authorities in the Region.

(*) Speech presented to the Iraqi Constitutional Studies Project at Princeton University (USA), on September 17th, 1994

The Kurdish view on the constitutional future of Iraq - Part I

2002-10-10T15:56:00.000-07:00

10 October 2002
By Dr Nouri Talabany

A draft Constitution for the Iraqi Kurdistan Region was prepared by me and later adopted, with some amendments, by an official High Legal Committee in 1992. It was presented, in its revised version, to the elected Parliament of that Region after it had unanimously adopted the federal system on 4th October 1992. About one-third of the members of that Parliament (33/105), from both main political parties, presented a written request to the Speaker for the project to be discussed and, later, adopted. Not only those members of Parliament, but also most members of the legal profession, supported it.

This proposed Constitution suggests ways in which the relationship between the Region of Iraqi Kurdistan and the Central Government in Baghdad can be developed.

I have added the text of a speech which I gave to a Constitutional Conference at Princeton University in September 1994, which explains clearly the ideas proposed in it in the hope that, together, they will explain the Kurdish view on the constitutional future of Iraq when its present dictatorial regime is no more.

The Parliament of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region proposed a federal system, which must be agreed by the Arab people of Iraq. The Kurdish view of how this system would apply to the Iraqi Kurdistan Region is explained in the text of this proposed Constitution. Such a system must be based, also, on democracy and freedom and on the respect of all aspects of human rights, including the rights of ethnic minorities and religious groups in the whole of Iraq. This would happen if the representative body of Arab Iraq accepted this proposal. If, however, this proposed system is not agreed, the Central Government cannot impose any other system on the Kurdistan Region, as it is contrary to the will of the Kurdish people.

This new, peaceful, federal, democratic Iraqi state, composed of two regions, i.e. Kurdistan and Arab Iraq, would play a vital role in maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East where it has previously been marginalized as a result of its failure to respect the wishes of its people.

London, 18th June 1999

The Draft Constitution

Preamble

Every society requires the existence of an authority that sets down general rules that are binding on the members of that society, and that authority is not legitimate unless exercised by the people or their representatives. Therefore, any government that does not come to power through election by the people is not a legitimate government. The exercise of power is determined by legal principles set down by peoples’ representatives and thus the constitution is considered as the highest legal standard, superseding all other laws. The government’s exercise of power is not legitimate unless it is exercised in the way prescribed by the constitution.

The people of Iraqi Kurdistan, too, have the right to govern themselves through a legitimate, elected body. They were exercising this right when, on May 19, 1992, they elected their first Regional Parliament.

Kurdistan was among the countries that were part of the Ottoman Empire until the end of the First World War. It was mentioned by name, together with the Arab countries and Armenia, by the American President Woodrow Wilson, in his plan submitted to the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919, which created the League of Nations. He asked that they all be put under an international mandate. The Sevres Treaty was concluded between the Allies and the Ottomans on August 10, 1920, and stipulated in articles 62-64 that preparations be made for the establishment of a Kurdish state which was to be, initially, Northern Kurdistan, to be joined later by Southern Kurdistan which comprised the greater part of the Ottoman Mosul Wilayet. Subsequent to the suspension of the articles of the Sevres Treaty dealing with the future of the Kurdish nation, and after the signing of the Lausanne Treaty between the Allies and the new regime in Turkey on July 24, 1923, Southern Kurdistan was annexed to the Iraqi Kingdom which was created by the British from the two Wilayets of Basra and Baghdad in 1921. The newly created Iraqi State and the British government, which had a mandate over Iraq, issued a joint declaration on December 24, 1922 which was communicated officially to the League of Nations by the mandatory power. In it, they stressed the right of the Kurdish people to a broad measure of autonomy within the new Iraqi State, including the formation of a Kurdish government.

It called on the Kurds to form this government themselves and to define their political and economic relations with both the new Iraqi State and the British government through negotiations with them. This joint declaration constitutes an official recognition of the right of the Kurdish people to establish a Kurdish entity within the newly created Iraqi State. Therefore, this joint Iraqi-British declaration constitutes a legal and historic basis for the demand by the people of Southern Kurdistan for a federal system after their annexation to the new Iraqi State in 1926. Under such a system, the Kurdistan Region will have sufficient safeguards to avoid any repetition of the tragedies that have befallen it for decades, especially since 1963, including the large scale relocation of the people in order to alter the ethnic composition and national identity of Kurdistan, and the systematic and total annihilation of its people by every type of lethal weapon, and the destruction of thousands of Kurdish villages and scores of small towns. All these acts can be considered as crimes of genocide, which are covered by the International Agreement on the Prevention of Genocide, adopted in Paris by the United Nations on December 9, 1948.

At a time when great changes have taken place in the world concerning the achievement of national rights, the reaffirmation of respect for human rights and basic freedoms for all people regardless of race, gender, language, or religion, the Kurdish people are still subject to crimes of genocide. The United Nations’ Charter was designed to save humanity from the tragedies of war and destruction and to reaffirm this international body’s belief in basic human rights and dignity and in equal rights for men and women and of all nations, great and small. The Kurdish people’s demand for self-determination, following the example of all other nations of the world, is a legitimate demand and is in accordance with Paragraph two of Article two of that Charter.

While suffering the greatest hardship during the latter part of this century, and being forced to carry arms against the successive dictatorships that have ruled Iraq since September 1961 in order to defend their very existence, tens of thousands of Kurds have been martyred. They have also been the victims of the notorious “Anfal” campaign, in which an estimated one hundred and eighty thousand Kurds, including men, women and children, young and old, have died. In March 1991 they courageously rose and liberated most of Kurdistan in a few days, but were then forced to abandon their homes and homeland in a mass exodus unprecedented in history when it was subjected to brutal retaliation by the dictatorship of Baghdad, which temporarily regained control of Kurdistan.

Since then, they have stoically resisted the hardships caused by the withdrawal of the civil administration from much of Kurdistan, and the imposition of an arbitrary economic blockade on it since October 1991 which caused starvation and suffering in the winter cold. Finally, by their impressive participation in the first free election in the history of Kurdistan to elect a Kurdish Parliament, they have expressed their commitment to freedom and their insistence on attaining and safeguarding their legitimate rights, including the right to self-determination.

The recognition of the right of the people of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region to self-determination does not necessarily mean its inevitable separation from Iraq, but it means living with the Arab people of Iraq in a voluntary federation, in a democratic system that recognizes the right of the Kurdish people to self-determination, and that guarantees basic human rights and freedom of expression and a multiplicity of political parties and organizations which will ensure the existence of such a federation and its survival.

History has shown that there can be no peace and stability in a multi-national state unless each nation feels that its rights are protected and that it governs itself by itself. Federalism is nowadays considered to be the best and most suitable system for multinational states provided that they adopt democracy, as this system not only protects the national rights of the member Regions, but also attempts to strengthen the Central Government with regard to the fundamental policies of the country and consolidates the foundations of the state.

In the light of the foregoing, and in order that the people of Kurdistan may enjoy their constitutional rights, which is one of the basic conditions of the federal system, and in order, also, to define the constitutional authority of the Kurdistan Region and to explain how the executive, legislative, and judicial authorities in Region can carry out their responsibilities, this Constitution was adopted for the Kurdistan Region by its Parliament

PART ONE

The Iraqi Kurdistan Region’s Political System

Article (1)

Iraqi Kurdistan, which comprises the governorates of Arbil, Dohuk, Sulaimani, and Kirkuk (with its pre-1968 administrative boundaries), and the Kurdish administrative districts of the Mosul, Diyala, and Koot governorates, is a Region of the Federal Republic of Iraq, which will have a democratic, parliamentary system.

Article (2)

1. All power rests with the people of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, who will determine their future unilaterally.

2. The people exercise their power through their representatives or, in exceptional cases, through a plebiscite, according to the provisions of this Constitution or according to a decision by the Iraqi Kurdistan Region’s Parliament.

Article (3)

The people of Iraqi Kurdistan enter into a voluntary federation with the Arabic part of Iraq within the framework of a Federal Iraqi Republic that will include two Regions enjoying equal rights guaranteed by a Federal Constitution to be enacted by the legislatures of the two Regions and the elected Federal Legislative Assemblies.

Article (4)

The population of Iraqi Kurdistan is comprised of Kurds, who are in the majority, and Turkmans, Assyrians and Arabs permanently resident in Kurdistan. This Constitution will establish the legitimate national rights of these minorities and law will regulate these rights.

Article (5)

1. Kurdish is the official language of Iraqi Kurdistan. In addition, Arabic will be an official language in matters concerning communications with the Federal Government.

2. Instruction at all levels of education will generally be in Kurdish. Arabic and one foreign language will be taught towards the end of the elementary level and in the higher levels. Minorities in Iraqi Kurdistan have the right to use their own language until they reach higher education.

Article (6)

The capital of Iraqi Kurdistan is Arbil (Hawler). Another city, when necessary, may be chosen as temporary capital by the Regional Government and with the approval of the Region’s Chief Executive.

Article (7)

Law shall determine the flag, the national anthem and the emblem of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. A Federal law shall determine the Iraqi Republic’s flag, national anthem and emblem.

Article (8)

1. Nawroz, which falls on March 21 of each year, is the Iraqi Kurdistan Region’s National Day.

2. The Kurdish calendar will be used in the Region in addition to the Gregorian calendar.

Article (9)

The status of Iraqi Kurdistan cannot be abolished by any means whatsoever; neither can any part of it be annexed to another Region except with the approval of two-thirds of the Kurdistan Region’s Parliament and that of the people of the Region by a referendum.

Article (10)

1. Twenty five percent (25%) of the General Federal Budget and other Central Government budgets shall be allocated to the Kurdistan Region. This percentage shall not be reduced by the decisions of the Federal Legislature or Government.

2. Fifty percent (50%) of the revenues from oil and minerals extracted from the Kurdistan Region’s soil shall be allocated to the Region itself.

Article (11)

The approval of the Kurdistan Region’s appropriate authorities must be obtained for the ratification of any financial or other treaties or agreements that the Federal Government wishes to conclude with other countries and international organizations, which may limit or decrease the authority of the Regional Government or affect its borders.

Article (12)

1. The legislative, judicial, and executive authorities in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region shall hold all powers, except those vested in the Federal Government, i.e. those relating to defence matters, international relations, issuance of national currency, citizenship, tariffs and customs, international airports, and central telephone and mail services.

2. The Kurdistan Region shall have the right to conclude treaties and agreements with foreign and international organizations and entities in humanitarian, cultural, and commercial fields.

Article (13)

The Kurdistan Region will be divided into administrative districts and governed on a decentralized basis.

Article (14)

The Kurdistan Region’s armed forces shall not be deployed outside the Region, nor shall the Federal armed forces be permitted to enter the Region without the written approval of the Region’s Government.

Article (15)

The citizens of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region shall perform military service only within the Region itself.

Article (16)

The citizens of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region shall serve proportionate to the Region’s population in all the Federal Ministries and institutions and international bodies in which Iraq participate.

PART TWO

Civil Rights and Freedoms
Chapter One
Civil Rights

Article (17)

1. All citizens are equal before the law with regard to their rights and responsibilities and all are accorded its protection equally and without discrimination.

2. Equal opportunity is guaranteed to all citizens of the Region.

Article (18)

Human dignity, honour and privacy are protected. A person’s privacy, honour and reputation shall not be violated arbitrarily or illegally.

Article (19)

1. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty in a court of law.

2. No one shall be sentenced to death for a crime committed for political reasons.

3. No one shall be sentenced to death for a crime committed while less than twenty years of age.

Article (20)

Punishment is personal; no one shall be punished for another person’s crime.

Article (21)

The right to defence is sacrosanct. The law guarantees an accused the right to defend himself personally or through a lawyer.

Article (22)

1. Law determines crimes and punishments.

2. No act shall be punishable unless it is considered a crime at the time of its commission.

3. When more than one penal code applies to a crime, the one more favourable to the accused shall be applied.

Article (23)

Anyone convicted of a crime is entitled to compensation as prescribed by law if it is discovered that a serious miscarriage of justice has occurred.

Article (24)

1. Any attack on a public service official during the performance of his duties, or as a result of them, is considered a crime.

2. Any attack by a public service official on a citizen’s personal freedom, privacy, or other rights and freedoms guaranteed by law and the Constitution, is considered a crime.

Article (25)

1. No one shall be detained, arrested, or imprisoned without a warrant from a judicial authority or any other authority authorized by law.

2. Under no circumstances shall anyone be tortured physically or psychologically for any reason whatsoever during his arrest, detention, or imprisonment.

3. A person is entitled to claim fair compensation for any damage incurred as a result of a violation of sections one and two of this Article.

4. A person is entitled to fair compensation for any material or psychological damage he suffers as a result of his arrest or detention, if proven innocent.

5. A person who is apprehended or arrested has the right to contact his family and his lawyer before he is interrogated, unless it is impossible to do so or there is convincing or compelling reason to speed up the interrogation.

Article (26)

Peoples’ homes are sacrosanct and cannot be entered or searched except within the limits and the procedures prescribed by law.

Article (27)

Work is the right and responsibility of every citizen and a source of pride. It is required by the necessity of contributing to the rebuilding, protection and development of Kurdistan. The Regional Government shall make every effort to provide employment for everyone able to work. No one shall be forced to work without pay.

Article (28)

By law the Kurdistan Regional Government provides the citizens with social security and other safeguards against illness, disability, and old age.

Article (29)

The Kurdistan Regional Government guarantees the Region’s citizens the right to an education. Elementary education shall be compulsory and the Regional Government shall seek to combat illiteracy by all legal means.

Article (30)

The Kurdistan Regional Government shall guarantee the freedom of scientific and academic research and shall provide the means for its advancement. It will develop and encourage excellence, creativity, and ingenuity in scientific, cultural, and intellectual areas.

Article (31)

1. Private property shall be protected by the Kurdistan Regional Government and regulated by law.

2. Private property cannot be taken away unless it is in the public interest to do so, in which case there will be fair compensation.

Article (32)

1. A citizen’s right to travel within and without the Kurdistan Region is guaranteed and his movement or residency cannot be restricted except in cases prescribed by law.

2. No citizen shall be banished from the Kurdistan Region, or barred from returning to live there, except in cases prescribed by law.

Article (33)

The right of citizenship is the most basic right and cannot be taken away for any reason whatsoever.

Article (34)

1. The right of political asylum is guaranteed to anyone persecuted in his own country and especially to those of Kurdish origin. The law shall regulate the conditions of political asylum and the rights and responsibilities of anyone who is granted such asylum.

2. The extradition of political refugees for any reason whatsoever is prohibited.

Article (35)

Every adult citizen, whether man or woman, residing permanently in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region has the right to elect, and to be elected, and to participate in plebiscites and in public life in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and the law.

Chapter Two

Liberties and their Regulation

Article (36)

1. Religious freedom is guaranteed to all, provided it is not incompatible with the provisions of the law.

2. The right to perform religious rites is guaranteed.

Article (37)

The right of peaceful assembly and demonstration is guaranteed within the limits of public law and order, and so long as it does not violate the rights and liberties of others. Law will regulate this right.

Article (38)

The right to strike and to withhold labour is guaranteed within the limits of the law.

Article (39)

Freedom of thought, and the right of expression by means of cultural and mass media is guaranteed. Law will regulate these freedoms.

Article (40)

Freedom of the press, printing and publishing is guaranteed within the law. There will be no censorship of newspapers and other publications except within the provisions of the law.

Article (41)

The media shall operate freely within the provisions of the law and without any violation of individual freedoms and privacy.

Article (42)

The right to form political parties and the freedom to join them are guaranteed to all. Law will regulate this.

Article (43)

The right to form organizations, associations and trade unions and the freedom to join them are guaranteed by law.

Article (44)

Forming political parties, associations, and organizations whose charters, programmes, methodology and conduct are undemocratic is prohibited. Political parties, organizations and associations must conduct their activities openly and without the use of force or violence. They are prohibited from possessing weapons under any circumstances.

Article (45)

Political parties, organizations and associations are prohibited from engaging in racial or sectarian propaganda or in any other act that might inflame racial or religious hatred.

Article (46)

Political parties are forbidden to engage in political or partisan activities in the armed forces and the security forces and among the members of the judiciary.

Article (47)

Political parties, trade unions, organizations and associations are not allowed to receive any domestic or foreign assistance or any movable or immovable property, in violation of the law.

Part Three

The Regional Authorities
Chapter One
The Legislative Authority (The Parliament)

Article (48)

The Iraqi Kurdistan Region’s Parliament represents the people of the Region and it alone has the right to pass Regional Laws, to decide the overall policies of the Region, to approve the Region’s Budget and to plan for economic development. It also maintains supervision over the Government. This will all be done in the manner stated in this Constitution.

Article (49)

The members of Parliament shall be elected by secret ballot by the citizens of the Region, according to law.

Article (50)

The law shall determine the requirements to be met by the parliamentary candidates. Anyone who participated in the planning of the crimes of the oppressive, dictatorial regime of Iraq, or who co-operated in the implementation of those plans, shall not be eligible for candidacy.

Article (51)

A Member of Parliament shall devote his time to his parliamentary work, and his previous job will be kept for him.

Article (52)

A Member of Parliament shall take the following oath before taking office: “ I do solemnly swear by God that I will protect the unity of the people and territory of Iraqi Kurdistan, and that I will protect the vital interests of the people and uphold the Constitution and the law.”

Article (53)

Members of Parliament will receive a salary set by law.

Article (54)

The term of office of Parliament shall be four years from the date of its first session. Preparations will be made during its final forty days of the election for a new Parliament.

Article (55)

Parliament shall arbitrate in the authenticating of the membership of its members. The Kurdistan Region’s High Court shall investigate the legitimacy of any challenges to Parliament after the Speaker refers those challenges to it. The result of the investigation and the court’s decision will be presented to Parliament. Membership will not be invalid except by a decision of a two-thirds majority of the members of Parliament.

Article (56)

A Member of Parliament is prohibited from buying or renting public property and from selling, bartering, or renting out his property to the state, or concluding a deal with the Regional Government as an importer, concessionaire, or contractor.

Article (57)

No Member of Parliament shall be stripped of his membership unless he fails to meet any of the requirements or to carry out the duties of membership. A decision to strip away membership requires a two-thirds majority in Parliament.

Article (58)

Parliament is the only authority able to accept the resignation of its members.

Article (59)

Opinions or ideas expressed by members of Parliament during the performance of their parliamentary duties, or whilst serving on its committees, cannot be held against them.

Article (60)

Unless apprehended in the commission of a crime, no criminal proceedings can be taken against a Member of Parliament except by prior permission of Parliament. If Parliament is not in session, the Speaker’s permission must be obtained and Parliament will be notified of any measures taken at its first meeting on reconvening.

Article (61)

The Region’s Chief Executive must call Parliament to its regular annual sessions before the second of October. If not called to session, it will convene in accordance with the Constitution on the above-mentioned date and will continue its regular sessions for a minimum period of eight months. Parliament will not adjourn before passing the Region’s General Budget.

Article (62)

In exceptional circumstances, the Region’s Chief Executive shall call Parliament to an extraordinary meeting at the request of the Region’s Cabinet, or by a request signed by no less then one-third of the members of Parliament.

Article (63)

The Region’s Cabinet, or ten members of Parliament, may introduce a bill. No bill can be discussed by Parliament before being examined by the appropriate Committee. Any bill, once rejected by Parliament, cannot be reintroduced in its current session.

Article (64)

The Region’s Annual Budget must be submitted to Parliament within one year from the end of the fiscal year. Likewise, a final annual report and the observations of the Region’s auditors must be submitted to Parliament who may request from them additional reports or information. In case of delay in the approval of the General Budget, monthly expenditures shall not exceed one-twelfth of the previous year’s General Budget.

Article (65)

The Region’s Government is not permitted to borrow money or to commit itself to a project that would incur further expenditure by the Treasury at a future date without the approval of Parliament.

Article (66)

Every Member of Parliament has the right to address questions to the Prime Minister and the members of the Cabinet within their areas of competence. Such questions shall be answered by the Prime Minister, or the members of the Cabinet, or by persons appointed to represent them. Members of Parliament also have the right to cross-examine them and to hold them accountable.

Article (67)

The deputy Prime Minister and ministers may be members of Parliament. Those who are not members may attend its meetings and Committees.

Article (68)

Once having taken the oath of office, a Member of Parliament shall devote all his time to his parliamentary work.

Please read Part II now:

The Kurdish view on the constitutional future of Iraq - Part II